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1. Introduction
In the winter of the year 1366, the Mamluk political scene was all set for the rising star of 
the amir Sayf al-Dīn Yalbughā al-ʿUmarī al-Nāṣirī al-Khāṣṣakī (d. 1366) to reach its 
zenith.1  The adolescent Qalāwūnid sultan, al-Malik al-Ashraf Sha‘ban (1353-1377; r. 
1363-1377), was firmly patronized by this former mamluk of Sha‘ban’s uncle, the sultan al-
Malik al-Nāṣir Ḥasan (d. 1361; r. 1347-1351 & 1354-1361).2  Furthermore, in February 
1366, Yalbughā’s  gradual empowerment after Ḥasan’s violent deposition in 1361 had 
reached a final stage when he managed to finish off the amir Ṭaybughā al-Ṭawīl 
(1325-1368), the last of his rivals  for effective power behind the Qalāwūnid throne.3 Finally, 
a major setback to Yalbughā’s  increasing success, which had suddenly and quite 
unexpectedly emerged from the Latin West in October 1365 — the ‘Alexandrian crusade’ 
of Peter I of Lusignan, king of Cyprus— had been turned to his  own advantage by late 
November 1366.4   In that month, a large revenge fleet’s construction was completed, 
manned and equipped for war against the island of Cyprus, and on Saturday 28 November 
its formidable combat capacities were demonstrated on the Nile outside Cairo, in a 
1
1  For a detailed account, analysis and assessment of Yalbughā’s career, within the larger remit of the 
Qalāwūnid sultanate and of Qalāwūnid political culture, see Jo Van Steenbergen, “The Last of the Qalāwūnid 
Magnates? Qalāwūnid Politics and the Case of the Amir Yalbughā al-Khāṣṣakī (d. 1366)”, in preparation.
2 See Van Steenbergen, “The Last of the Qalāwūnid Magnates?”; Jo Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos. 
Patronage, Conflict and Mamluk Socio-Political Culture. 1341-1382, The Medieval Mediterranean: Peoples, 
Economies and Cultures, 400-1500, vol. 65 (Leiden, 2006), 117, 158-160.
3  See Van Steenbergen, “The Last of the Qalāwūnid Magnates?”; Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 
159.
4  Robert Irwin, on the other hand, considers this event a major cause behind Yalbughā’s downfall (Robert 
Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages: the early Mamluk Sultanate 1250-1382 [London, 1986], 145). On 
this crusade, see Peter Edbury, “The Crusading Policy of King Peter I of Cyprus, 1359-1369”, in The Eastern 
Mediterranean Lands in the Periods of the Crusades, ed. Peter M. Holt (London, 1977), 90-105; Peter 
Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374 (Cambridge, 1991); Martina Müller-Wiener, 
Eine Stadtgeschichte Alexandrias von 564/1169 bis in die Mitte des 9./15. Jahrhunderts: Verwaltung und 
innerstädtische Organisationsformen (Berlin, 1992); Jo Van Steenbergen, “The Alexandrian Crusade (1365) 
and the Mamluk Sources : reassessment of the Kitāb al-Ilmām of an-Nuwayrī al-ʾIskandarānī (d. 1372 AD)”, 
in East and West in the Crusader States. Context - Contacts - Confrontations, III. Acta of the congress held 
at Hernen Castle in September 2000, eds. K. Ciggaar & H.G.B. Teule, Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, vol. 
125 (Leuven, 2003), 123-137 (however, this paper should be treated with some caution [I consider it to 
demonstrate my callowness at the time!] in light of Otfried Weintritt, Formen spätmittelalterlicher islamischer 
Geschichtsdarstellung: Untersuchung zu an-Nuwairī al-Iskandarānīs Kitāb al-Ilmām und verwandten 
zeitgenössischen Texten, [Beirut, 1992]).
massively attended and awe-inspiring enactment of sea warfare, described by al-Maqrīzī 
as follows:
The sultan, the amir Yalbughā and all the regime’s  amirs and notables rode out to 
view the warships (al-shawānī). They had been successfully completed and their 
crews were ready. …. The sultan led his armies from the citadel to the island of Urwā 
[or Jazīrat al-Wuṣṭā, between the islands of Rawḍa and Ḥalīma], and boarded the 
“fire ship” (al-ḥarrāqa), while the banks were filled with people. The war ships (al-
shawānī) came and its crews played with the war equipments, as one would do in an 
engagement with the enemy, with their drums being beaten, their trumpets being 
blown, and the naphtha bombs being released. It was a frightening but beautiful 
spectacle, and a good thing if it would have served its purpose (law tamma).5
Commissioned by Yalbughā and constructed —as one contemporary author testified— “in 
less than a year, despite the lack of wood and material”6, this  fleet of 100 warships— each 
manned by some 150 sailors7 as well as by a handful from each of the amirs’ mamluks, 
geared for war8— generally must have been considered a remarkable feat and a clear 
token of Yalbughā’s promising capacities. Hence, its spectacular public presentation in late 
November 1366 washed off any stain left by the Alexandrian crusade on Yalbughā’s  public 
image as  legitimate powerholder behind the ephemeral Qalāwūnid sultan Sha‘ban. When 
Yalbughā thereupon proceeded to go hunting on the Nile’s West bank, near Gizeh, there 
was nothing and no one left to vie with his status and authority. At least, that is what things 
looked like. But Yalbughā was soon to experience how appearances can be misleading!
As al-Maqrīzī suggested from hindsight, Yalbughā’s  fleet would never really serve its 
purpose. On the contrary: instead of setting sail to Cyprus, it remained on the Nile, 
between Cairo and Bulāq al-Takrūrī on the West bank, and was probably for the most part 
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5  Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Maʿrifat Duwal al-Mulūk, ed. M.M. Ziyādah et al. (Cairo, 
1934-72), 3:129-30. For a detailed contemporary description of this public inauguration ceremony and of the 
strong impression it left, including on Catalan envoys, see Muḥammad al-Nuwayrī al-Iskandarānī, al-Ilmām 
bi-mā jarat bihi al-Aḥkām wa l-Umūr al-muqḍīya fī waqʿat al-Iskandarīya sanata 767 h., ed. A.S. Atiya 
(Hyderabad, 1986-73), 3:231-4. On the types of ships mentioned here, see Dionisius A. Agius, Classic Ships 
of Islam. From Mesopotamia to the Indian Ocean, Handbook of Oriental  Studies. Section 1 the Near and 
Middle East, vol. 92 (Leiden, 2008), 343-8. For the exact location of the island of Urwā, see the map in André 
Raymond, Cairo. City of History, (Cairo, 2001), 150; on its whereabouts in the 14th century, see Aḥmad b. 
ʿAlī al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Mawāʿiẓ wa l-Iʿtibār bi dhikr al-Khiṭaṭ wa l-Āthār, (Beirut, 1998), 3:326.
6  Aḥmad al-Bayrūtī, [unknown title], Oxford, Bodleian Ms. Marshall (or.) 36, fol. 2r. (See also fn. 10 on this 
manuscript).
7 See Dionisius A. Agius, “The Arab Šalandī”, in Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras-III, 
eds. Urbain Vermeulen and Jo Van Steenbergen, Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, vol. 102 (Leuven, 2001), 
58-9.
8 See al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3: 129.
left to rot.9   This, however, would only happen after it was deployed there one more time, 
about a fortnight after its promising inauguration. At this one occasion, instead of being 
deployed as a mighty instrument of muslim revenge against crusading infidels, it was used 
against fellow muslims, the latter ironically including Yalbughā himself! On Tuesday 8 
December Yalbughā narrowly escaped his attempted murder at his hunting camp near 
Gizeh, only managing to cross back to his residence near Cairo in the course of the 
following day. Subsequently, he tried to undo this rebellion by isolating it and preventing 
his opponents  from crossing the Nile and returning to Cairo. But when the latter obtained 
part of their opponent’s revenge fleet, the Nile between Cairo and Gizeh again witnessed 
an enactment of sea warfare, but now for real and between two groups of amirs and 
mamluks, one supportive of Yalbughā on the East side and on the island of Urwā, and 
another opposing him on the West bank, featuring the sultan al-Malik al-Ashraf Shaʿbān as 
well as large numbers of Yalbughā’s  own mamluks, the Yalbughāwīya. This spectacle 
surely must have been as  impressive as  the one that was staged two weeks  earlier, at 
least according to historical reports like the following one by the mysterious contemporary 
chronicler Aḥmad al-Bayrūtī:
[Yalbughā] remained on the Jazīrat al-Wuṣṭā [/Urwā] while al-Malik al-Ashraf and his 
company were on the bank of [Bulāq] al-Takrūri. Someone known as Muḥammad b. 
Bint Labṭa, the captain (al-rāyis), then came to al-Malik al-Ashraf, offered him about 
thirty of the newly built ships, with crew, and he broke the ships’ rigging (burūq al-
marākib), thus flattening them in order they could cross over. A number of the amirs 
and of the mamluks of Yalbughā embarked upon them for the crossing, but Yalbughā 
shot naphtha bombs at them. Thereupon, they made the ships’ crews bring them 
close to the river bank, shooting arrows at Yalbughā so as  to hit his companions and 
drive them back to where they came from. But Yalbughā and his  companions shot at 
them with arrows and naphtha, without, however, impressing them.10
3
9 In fact, one of these ships is explicitly reported to have been used, in the course of 1368, by a sea captain 
(rāyis al-baḥr) known as Muḥammad al-Tāzī al-Maghrabī in a successful corsairing campaign against a ship 
of the ‘Franks’ (al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:159). Most of this Egyptian fleet’s whereabouts, however, remain 
unknown, but it may indeed have shared in the fate of it’s Syrian counterpart, which was left to rot near 
Beirut (see Albrecht Fuess, “Rotting Ships and Razed Harbors: The Naval Policy of the Mamluks”, MSR 5 
[2001]: 52-53; on rotting ships, see also Agius, Classic Ships of Islam, 253-4, 260-2).
10  al-Bayrūtī, fol. 3r (for a single, extremely brief reference to this so far untraceable chronicler and the 
unique, 788 AH [1386 CE] manuscript [in 131 folia] of his very valuable chronicle for the years 769-779 AH, 
see Carl  Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur. Zweite den Supplementbänden angepasste 
Auflage, [Leiden, 1943-9], 2:61 [“A. al-Bairūtī schrieb: Eine Geschichte der J. 768-80/1366-78 (sic !) mit 
Nekrologen”]). Another account of this engagement, with even more detail, may be found in al-Maqrīzī, 
Sulūk, 3:133-5. Thanks are due to Dionisius A. Agius for helping me with the translation of this passage.
Thus, Yalbughā tried to regain control of the situation with a host of impressive strategic, 
military and institutional measures. These included not only his blockade of the Nile and 
his engagement in sea warfare, but also such remarkable measures as  the installation of 
yet another Qalāwūnid sultan instead of the recalcitrant and absent Shaʿbān: al-Malik al-
Manṣūr Ānūk b. Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (d. 1391), mockingly referred to by 
commoners and chroniclers  alike as ‘sulṭān al-jazīra’, since he only held court for one day 
on the above-mentioned island.11  When, however, on Saturday 12 December al-Ashraf 
Shaʿbān and his supporters eventually managed to cross the Nile and catch up with their 
Cairene supporters, Yalbughā’s attempts to revert the situation proved futile, and after his 
arrest the conflict ended in the following gruesome manner:
“[Yalbughā’s] mamluks  came, took him from the prison and brought him down from 
the citadel. When he went through the Bāb al-Qalʿa and waited at the wall, they 
brought him a horse to ride. But when he intended to mount, a mamluk called 
Qarātamur hit him [with his sword], decapitating him, whereupon [others] jumped at 
him with their swords, cutting him to pieces. They took his head and held it in a 
burning torch for the bleeding to stop, though some of them refused to have anything 
to do with that. When they removed the torch, the bleeding had stopped and they 
wiped [the head] clean. They could no longer recognize him [in it] but for the scar he 
had under his ear. Then, they took his body and brought it to al-ʿArūsatayn to hide it 
there. But under cover of the night[’s darkness], Ṭashtamur, [Yalbughā’s] dawādār, 
came and took the head from them, and he looked for the body until he found it. He 
had it stitched, and then he buried it in the mausoleum which [Yalbughā] had 
constructed near the mausoleum of Khwand Umm Ānūk, at al-Rawḍa, outside Bāb 
al-Barqīya.”12
4
11  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:133-4, 135; Aḥmad b. Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Durar al-Kāmina fī  Aʿyān al-Mīʾa al-
Thāmina, ed. H. al-Nadawī (Beirut, 1993), 1:418-9; Abū  l-Maḥāsin Yūsuf b. Taghrī Birdī, al-Manhal  al-Ṣāfī  wa 
l-Mustawfī baʿda l-Wāfī, ed. M.M. Amīn (Cairo, 1986-), 3:107-8.
12 al-Bayrūtī, fol. 3v; similar story in al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:136.
2. An Assessment of Historiography
When Mamluk studies have awarded any attention at all to this drawn-out military 
engagement in early December 1366, it was indifferently done quite briefly within a larger 
historical or conceptual framework. Moreover, in their summary reconstructions, such 
studies invariably identified either al-Ashraf Shaʿbān, or a nameless mass of the 
Yalbughāwīya, or both, as  the culprits  for this remarkable and abominable turn of events. 
Thus, in the 1960s, in William Brinner’s  preliminary attempt to make sense of late 14th 
century power struggles, he entirely blamed the sultan, claiming that he was “determined 
to be ruler in fact as well as in name”.13 In the early 1980s, Werner Krebs’s chronological 
reconstruction of Mamluk history between 1341 and 1382 accused first and foremost 
Yalbughā’s mamluks, identifying them as “die Masse seiner namenlosen Mamluken”.14 In 
their historical surveys of ‘medieval’ islamic history, both published in 1986, Robert Irwin 
and Peter Holt generally agreed with this view, adding some more nuances. The former 
stated that “Yalbughā was killed in 1366 by some of his own mamluks who had been 
unable to endure their master’s harsh discipline any longer”, adding that “though the sultan 
approved their action, he was not fully master of the changed situation”.15  Agreeing with 
the Yalbughāwīya’s involvement, Holt, however, conversely also repeated Brinner’s 
accusation against Shaʿbān, claiming that “al-Ashraf Shaʿbān, now old enough to take a 
hand in politics, gave his patronage to a faction of malcontent Mamluks”.16 The last scholar 
who dealt with this conflict in any serious fashion was Amalia Levanoni, who in 1995 
followed the arguments put forward by Krebs and Irwin, stating that 
when the Yalbughāwīya mamluks rebelled against their master, Yalbughā al-ʿUmarī, 
the idea of the rebellion had originated with the mamluks, and they were the ones 
who forced the senior amirs to join them, threatening those who would not unite with 
them with dire consequences. Following the success of the rebellion, the mamluks 
5
13 William M. Brinner, “The Struggle for Power in the Mamlūk State: Some Reflections on the Transition from 
Baḥrī to Burjī Rule”, in Proceedings of the 26th International Congress of Orientalists. New Delhi, 4-10 
January 1964 (New Delhi, 1970), 233.
14  Werner Krebs, “Innen- und Außenpolitik Ägyptens, 741-784/1341-1382” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Universität 
Hamburg, 1980), 101-2. At about the same time, Ḥayāt Nāṣir al-Ḥajjī came to a similar conclusion, see his 
“al-Aḥwāl al-Dākhilīya fī Salṭanat al-Ashraf Shaʿbān b. Ḥusayn f. Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn. 764-778 h/
1362-1376m”, ʿĀlam al-Fikr 14/3 (1983): 782-4.
15 Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages, 148
16 Peter M. Holt, The Age of the Crusades. The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517, A History of 
the Near East (London, 1986), 127; repeated in Peter M. Holt, “Miṣr,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., 
7:171, & in Peter M. Holt, “Shaʿbān. 2. al-Malik al-Ashraf”, EI2, 9: 155.
insisted that the sultan, al-Ashraf Shaʿbān, hand over to them their defeated master 
whom they then murdered.17
From all this, it has to be acknowledged that the analysis of this conflict has  not really been 
furthered much beyond the eye-brow-raising views  that were already formulated by the 
late 19th-century orientalist William Muir. In his “The Mameluke or Slave Dynasty of Egypt”, 
he stated that 
Yelbogha […] was at first the dominant Emir; but his atrocities so transcended even 
the barbarous precedents of the age as to arouse the hatred of the people, who 
rallied to the support of the young sultan when Yelbogha rebelled and would have 
raised another brother to the throne. The tyrant was defeated, and his head exposed 
upon a burning torch. His  memlukes, however, remained dominant and in their wild 
excesses had the city at their mercy.18
Despite a flavor of historical inaccuracy in the latter statement, Muir’s reading of the 
conflict, implicating the Yalbughāwīya, clearly has remained the bottom line of scholarly 
consensus until this day. Moreover, just as  Muir implied that “the tyrant” really had it 
coming, this idea of Yalbughā’s harsh attitude towards  his  mamluks triggering their actions 
has remained the prevalent explanation for such remarkable and radical breaking of the 
mutually beneficial bonds that tied rank-and-file mamluks to their master. Whereas the 
passing references to such harshness  by Irwin and Holt suggested that like Muir they 
simply considered Yalbughā unfit for the job, Levanoni in 1995 took this  moral argument 
one step further, by linking it to a “remamlukisation” project endeavored by Yalbughā in 
order to stem the tide of moral laxity in the military ranks, which allegedly had set in during 
the reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad.19  Hence, she not only blamed Yalbughā and “his  crass 
attitude towards [his mamluks], the humiliations they suffered at his hands, and the 
excessive punishments he meted out”, but also the Yalbughāwīya, who “had become too 
6
17 Amalia Levanoni, A Turning Point in Mamluk History. The Third Reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad Ibn Qalāwūn. 
1310-1341, Islamic History and Civilization. Studies and Texts, vol. 10 (Leiden, 1995), 119-120; also 89. 
Repeated in her “Rank-and-file Mamluks versus amirs: new norms in the Mamluk military institution,” in The 
Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society, eds. Thomas Philipp & Ulrich Haarmann, Cambridge Studies in 
Islamic Civilization (Cambridge, 1998), 25.
18 W. Muir, The Mameluke or Slave Dynasty of Egypt. A History of Egypt from the fall  of the Ayyubite Dynasty 
to the Conquest by the Osmanlis. A.D. 1260-1517, (London, 1896; repr. Amsterdam, 1968), 97.
19 For an earlier passing reference to this ‘remamlukisation’-thesis, see Holt, “Miṣr”, 171. It was also repeated 
and elaborated by Linda S. Northrup in her “The Baḥrī Mamlūk sultanate, 1250-1390,” in The Cambridge 
History of Egypt, Volume 1, Islamic Egypt, 640-1517, ed. Carl  F. Petry (Cambridge, 1998), 286-9. For a 
critical approach to such a concept of an ideal, normative ‘mamlūk phenomenon’, as originating in the 13th 
century, see Peter Thorau, “Einige kritische Bemerkungen zum sogenannten ‘mamlūk phenomenon’,” in Die 
Mamlūken. Studien zu ihrer Geschichte und Kultur. Zum Gedenken an Ulrich Haarmann (1942-1999), eds. 
Stephan Conermann & Anja Pistor-Hatam, Asien und Afrika. Beiträge des Zentrums für Asiatische und 
Afrikanische Studien (ZAAS) der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Band 7 (Hamburg, 2003), 367-78.
reliant on conditions of material permissiveness” and who were characterized by 
“disloyalty, lack of restraint, and greed”.20
However, in limiting themselves to such dismissive, negative appreciations of this  episode 
and its protagonists —Yalbughā wronged his own mamluks, and they were all rogues and 
up to no good—, all modern studies alike demonstrate first and foremost how deeply 
embedded they are in the value judgements of near contemporary historians (and it has 
been sufficiently demonstrated in recent years how such an approach entails many 
pitfalls21). Thus, Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406) —who had access  to inside information on this 
as well as  subsequent episodes because of his  close friendship with the Yalbughāwī 
Alṭunbughā al-Jūbānī (ca. 1341-1389)22— very succinctly assesses the background of the 
1366-revolt as follows:
“Yalbughā’s autocracy (istibdāduhu)) had been lasting long for the sultan, and his 
cruelty (waṭʾatuhu) had been hard to bear for the amirs, for the regime’s employees, 
and especially for his mamluks. He had been increasing the number of mamluks, 
disciplining them in an extreme fashion and overstepping all bounds when he beat 
them with the stick, until their noses were cut off and their ears were severed 
(tajāwaza al-ḍarb  fīhim bi-l-ʿaṣā ilā jadʿ al-unūf wa ṣṭilām al-ādhān). ... [That is why] 
they harbored [feelings of] disloyalty (al-ghishsh).”23
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20 Levanoni, A Turning Point in Mamluk History, 88-89, 90, 103.
21  See e.g. Amalia Levanoni, “Al-Maqrīzī’s account of the Transition from Turkish to Circassian Mamluk 
Sultanate : History in the Service of Faith”, in The Historiography of Islamic Egypt (c. 950-1800), ed. Hugh 
Kennedy, The Medieval Mediterranean: Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400-1453, vol. 31 (Leiden, 2001), 
93-105.
On top of that, it can also be convincingly suggested that this pervasive uncritical  and negative approach to 
the 1366 conflict owes an equal lot to the wide-spread tendency to assess Mamluk political history through a 
modern, Marxist and/or system’s analysis prism, anachronistically applying modern conceptions of class, 
class consciousness and solidarity, and class struggle to a premodern society (i.e. the mamluk proletariat 
struggling for their emancipation from their control  by the bourgeois amirs!). In this respect, see, for instance, 
Winslow W. Clifford’s apt and stimulating analysis in his “Ubi Sumus? Mamluk History and Social Theory,” 
MSR 1 (1997): 45-62.
22  See Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-ʿIbar wa Dīwān al-Mubtadā wa l-Khabar fī  ayyām al-ʿArab wa l-ʿAjam wa l-
Barbar wa man ʿāṣarahum min dhawī al-sulṭān al-akbar, ed. N. al-Haruni (Cairo, 1867-1868), 5:476.
23 Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-ʿIbar, 5:456.
Al-Maqrīzī, a student and well-known admirer of Ibn Khaldūn24, later repeated this general 
negative stance, claiming that this Yalbughā character would beat his mamluks with a whip 
and cut off their tongues.25 
However, what has not been picked up so far, and what is  very striking in this context, is 
that all other Mamluk chroniclers that discuss this episode in Mamluk history, including the 
contemporaries al-Bayrūtī (fl. latter half 14th c.) and Ibn Duqmāq (ca. 1350-1407) refrain 
from making such value judgements. This  ‘depreciation’ of Yalbughā in particular is  only 
present with Ibn Khaldūn, and with al-Maqrīzī after him, actually justifying in unmistakeable 
fashion the Yalbughāwīya’s actions against their master. Was this perhaps primarily how 
surviving Yalbughāwīya, like Ibn Khaldūn’s  source Alṭunbughā or like Ibn Khaldūn’s patron, 
the sultan Barqūq (r. 1382-89, 1390-99), preferred to remember this black page in their 
history?
Nevertheless, it would be otiose to doubt that there may well be a kernel of truth in these 
assertions, that Yalbughā was an unpleasant man to work for, that there was a general 
feeling of physical maltreatment among Yalbughā’s  mamluks, and that the December 1366 
revolt had much to do with that. Even so, it remains  puzzling that these disgruntled 
mamluks had chosen to support Yalbughā on several earlier occasions, until just a few 
months earlier, in February 1366, against his peer Ṭaybughā, who at the time could count 
on a lot of support among the amirs and also among the commoners.26  Why, or perhaps 
more appropriate, how did they change their mind and eventually turn against him, in 
December 1366? Was there more at stake, triggering these harbored feelings of disloyalty 
to erupt at this specific moment?
In all, this is one episode from a long list in Mamluk history that continues to generate 
many more questions than those that have been considered so far. Especially from a long-
term historical perspective, it becomes increasingly relevant to pursue such questions and 
start digging beyond today’s surface of Mamluk history. In the present context, for 
instance, the underlying assumption in modern historiography’s  face-value acceptance of 
Ibn Khaldūn’s views seems to be that for nearly two centuries decline from an initial late-
thirteenth and early-fourteenth century point of success was predominant in the sultanate’s 
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24 See for instance Robert Irwin, “Al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Khaldūn: Historians of the Unseen”, MSR 7/2 (2003): 
217-225; Anne F. Broadbridge, “Royal Authority, Justice, and Order in Society: The Influence of Ibn Khaldūn 
on the Writings of al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Taghrībirdī”, MSR 7/2 (2003): 231-245.
25 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:130. See also Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11: 36.
26 See Van Steenbergen, “The Last of the Qalāwūnid Magnates?”.
history. More precisely, the above perception of the December 1366 conflict as a total 
breakdown of the ‘natural’ relationship between mamluks and their master turns it into a 
telling exception to the alleged rule that there was a ‘Mamluk system’ of unconditional 
loyalty to one’s master (ustādh) and to one’s peers (khushdāsh) dominating Mamluk 
politics  at large, which had been responsible for the sultanate’s initial successes, but which 
got increasingly strained thereafter.27  Therefore, the conflict’s  perception as the breaking 
of this crucial taboo and normative code perfectly confirms and illustrates the idea of crisis 
and of the breakdown of norms and behavior in the quagmire of what must have been a 
horrible fourteenth century, from which the sultanate would never really manage to escape 
again, despite any attempts at ‘remamlukisation’. 
But does such a linear, comparative approach really do justice to what actually happened 
in that fourteenth century, let alone to what happened thereafter? As said, time has 
definitely come to start delving beyond such static, judgmental and negative views of 
Mamluk history, moving away from a focus on “what went wrong” and towards an 
appreciation of the many dimensions  of Mamluk historical change in their own right. 
Therefore, in the second part of this article, the December 1366 conflict will be analyzed 
from one among quite a few possible alternative angles.28  It will be claimed that 
prosopography, and a more accurate identification of Yalbughā’s opponents and of their 
relationship with Yalbughā in general, opens up very interesting new perspectives. This  will 
eventually allow for a more positive reading of the causes and consequences  of this 
conflict, moving away from the depressing ‘Khaldūnian’ ‘decline paradigm’ that has 
perverted Mamluk studies for far too long now, and towards an understanding in its own 
right of the process of change and transformation which the Mamluk sultanate clearly was 
9
27  On this ‘Mamluk system’, as the static backbone of the Mamluk political economy, see especially the 
various pioneering works by David Ayalon (mainly republished in his collected volumes: The Mamlūk Military 
Society: Collected Studies, [London, 1979]; Outsiders in the Lands of Islam: Mamluks, Mongols, and 
Eunuchs, [London, 1988]; Islam and the Abode of War, [Aldershot, 1994]; and neatly summarised in Reuven 
Amitai, "David Ayalon, 1914-1998," MSR 3 (1999): 1-12. For an updated, more dynamic (in a negative 
sense, though [see fn. 29]) version, see Levanoni, Turning Point, esp. 4-27.
28 Inspiration for these angles may (in fact, should) certainly be searched for in concepts, views and ideas as 
developed in related fields of pre-modern historical  research, such as (among others) in the works of Gerd 
Althoff (eg. his Die Macht der Rituale: Symbolik und Herrschaft im Mittelalter, [Darmstadt, 2003]), Marco 
Mostert (eg. New Approaches to Medieval Communication, [Turnhout, 1999]), and Geoffrey Koziol (eg. 
Begging pardon and favor: Ritual and political order in early medieval France, [Ithaca, 1992]).
undergoing by the latter half of the fourteenth century, and which were to ensure its 
continued existence well into the sixteenth century!29
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29  For the identification of a notion of ‘decline’ permeating Levanoni’s Turning Point, see the review by 
Winslow W. Clifford in MSR 1 (1997): 179-82. For a very stimulating survey of modern Ottoman 
historiography’s recent move away from its ‘decline paradigm’, see Donald Quataert, “Ottoman History 
Writing and Changing Attitudes Towards the Notion of ‘Decline’”, History Compass 1 (2003): 1-9. The 
conceptual and practical  parallels with Mamluk historiography, both modern and contemporary, are extremely 
striking, and call for a similar revision that may “offer a more nuanced view of the [Mamluk] experience, … 
discussing the realities of those experiences rather than [Mamluk] failures to follow particular patterns of 
change” (p. 3); if gradually implemented in Mamluk studies, also in light of a larger perspective offered by 
comparative and global history, such a revision will undoubtedly be as revealing as in the Ottoman case, 
where Quataert describes how “the emerging new scholarship  is revealing an Ottoman state (society and 
economy) in the process of continuous transformation, rather than a decline or fall from idealized norms of 
the past…. In this new understanding, the Ottoman state underwent continuous modifications in its domestic 
policy, an ongoing evolution in which there is no idealized form, since change itself is understood as the 
norm.” (p. 4)
3. The Yalbughāwhīya: veteran amirs and junior mamluks
If one takes a closer look at the December 1366 conflict, and at Yalbughā’s opponents in 
particular, there certainly are a number of factors that deserve much more attention than 
hitherto awarded. As far as causes and consequences of the rebellion are concerned, the 
most important aspect among these factors concerns the sliding scale of multiple 
relationships between Yalbughā and his opponents, revealing how in many modern 
studies the latter so far have been unjustly reduced to generic terms such as “the 
Yalbughāwīya mamluks”. Certainly, Yalbughā’s mamluks were deeply involved, but not all 
of them at the same time, nor for the same reasons, nor in similar fashion. There was 
indeed much more at stake than malcontent mamluks simply breaking up with their 
master!
Veteran amirs
Continuing his above-mentioned account of the rebellion, Ibn Khaldūn actually explains 
how one amir’s brother one day fell victim to Yalbughā’s  notorious tempers, enjoining that 
amir, Asandamur al-Nāṣirī (d. 1368), to conspire with his peers and the sultan against 
Yalbughā.30  The other extant contemporary accounts, by Ibn Duqmāq and al-Bayrūtī, give 
more details on this aspect of the rebellion. In almost identical wording, they both claimed 
that 
“there was agreed [to revolt] by the mamluks of Yalbughā who had been promoted 
amir by him, by their ‘brothers’, and by the leading ḥalqa chiefs (mamālīk Yalbughā 
alladhīna ammarahum wa ikhwatuhum wa ruʾūs al-bāshāt)31, including Aqbughā al-
Aḥmadī, known as  al-Jalab, Asandamur al-Nāṣirī, Qajmās  al-Ṭāzī, Taghrī Birmish 
al-ʿAlāʾī, Aqbughā Jarkas  Amīr Silāḥ, and Qarābughā al-Ṣarghitmishī, as well as 
those that had allied with them. They geared up [for combat], rode out and attacked 
11
30 Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-‘Ibar, 5:356.
31 On the latter title, rarely encountered and therefore less well-known, see Khalīl b. Shāhīn al-Ẓāhirī, Zubdat 
Kashf al-Mamālik fī Bayān al-Ṭuruq wa l-Masālik, ed. Paul Ravaisse (Paris, 1894), 116: “every one hundred 
from a thousand [ḥalqa troopers] have a chief (bāsh) and a superintendent (naqīb).”
their ustādh, the honourable atābak Yalbughā al-ʿUmarī, raiding his encampment [at 
Gizeh] and intending to kill him.”32 
Al-Maqrīzī, for his part, agreeing on the identity of these six as leaders of the revolt, 
explains their action further, incorporating these contemporary accounts and at the same 
time implementing, as  it would seem, an expanded version of Ibn Khaldūn’s  moralizing 
story line. He claims that the young recruits got fed up with Yalbughā’s harsh treatment of 
them, whereupon these six amirs went to Yalbughā to plea their case, asking him to relent 
and to show them some mercy. Thereupon, however, Yalbughā would have insulted and 
threatened these amirs, which ultimately convinced them to attack Yalbughā’s 
encampment in conjunction with those malcontent mamluks.33  
Whatever the truth of the matter, this ‘gang’ of six Yalbughāwī amirs clearly constituted a 
major factor in the conflict’s initial phase, and, as it would turn out, they were also to figure 
prominently among its  political and institutional beneficiaries. The morning after Yalbughā’s 
murder, four amirs —including three out of these six initiators: Aqbughā al-Aḥmadī al-Jalab 
(d. 1367), Asandamur al-Nāṣirī (d. 1368) and Qajmās al-Ṭāzī (fl. 1360s)34— were even 
reported to have been “installed as  the spokesmen for the untying and tying [of the 
12
32 Quoted from al-Bayrūtī, fol. 2v; also in Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. Aydamur b. Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām fī 
Tārīkh al-Islām”, Forschungs- und Landesbibliothek Gotha MS Orient A 1572, fol. 2v. (in fact, this passage’s 
version in the latter autograph manuscript, dated 784 AH/1382 CE, shows only 3 slight but reductive 
modifications to al-Bayrūtī’s text, as it appears in the Bodleian manuscript from 788 AH/1386 CE: Ibn 
Duqmāq’s text collapses the phrase (wa ruʾūs al-bāshāt minhum - “by the leading halqa chiefs, including…” ) 
into a less enigmatic  variant (wa ruʾūsuhum … - “and their leaders were…”) and drops altogether the 
attributive relative clause (al-maʿrūf bi  - “known as”) after the name of Aqbughā al-Aḥmadī, as well as the 
verb (labisū - “they geared up”). 
An identical fragment, equally with slight modifications (but not as reductive as Ibn Duqmāq’s), is in the 15th 
c. chronicle of Maḥmūd al-ʿAynī, “‘Iqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān”, Dār al-Kutub MS 1584 tārīkh, fol. 
144r (in this version, the initial verb is put in the third person feminine singular (ittafaqat) instead of the third 
person masculin plural  (ittafaqū) in al-Bayrūtī and Ibn Duqmāq; the verb kabasū (“they attacked/raided”) is 
dropped (and not labisū as in Ibn Duqmāq); there are minor adjustments to certain names (twice adding al-
Khāṣṣakī to Yalbughā’s name, once changing his title from the official form of address (al-maqarr al-atābakī - 
“the honourable atābak”) to the more functional (al-atābak), and once specifying that “Aqbughā al-Aḥmadī, 
known as Jalab, [was] raʾs nawba [a mamluks’ chief]”). On the problematic identity of this manuscript in 
relation to other extant copies of the work of this author, see my discussion with Sami Massoud as 
reconstructed in his The Chronicles and Annalistic Sources of the Early Mamluk Circassian Period, Islamic 
History and Civilization. Studies and Texts, vol. 67 (Leiden, 2007), 41-5.
An adjusted, but clearly related version of this passage may be found in the Jawhar al-Thamīn, the summary 
chronicle of Islamic history by the same Ibn Duqmāq, interestingly now denoting these six amirs as chiefs 
[bāshātuhum] (Ibn Duqmāq, al-Jawhar al-Thamīn fī siyar al-Khulafā  ʾwa l-Mulūk wa l-Salāṭīn, ed. S.ʿA. ʿĀshūr 
(Mecca, 1982) 415). 
Finally, also the version of Ibn Taghrī Birdī clearly represents similar substance, demonstrating obvious 
textual traces of a contemporary original  (Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī  Mulūk Miṣr wa l-Qāhira, ed. 
I.ʿA. Ṭarkhān (Cairo, 1963-72), 11:36).
33 al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:130-1.
34 The fourth amir, Ṭughāytamur al-Niẓāmī, a high-ranking member of the political elite for several  years, had 
been siding with Yalbughā for most of the December 1366 conflict, but he had changed camps just in time 
not to be discredited by Yalbughā’s downfall (al-Bayrūtī, fol. 3r-3v; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:74, 75, 134-5); his 
(brief) leadership after Yalbughā’s murder is confirmed from his biography in Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 2:223.
regime’s business], for the giving and taking [of the regime’s wealth], and for the 
appointment and the dismissal [of the regime’s functionaries].”35 Soon thereafter, this  shift 
was confirmed institutionally, when these “spokesmen” reshuffled al-Ashraf Shaʿbān’s 
entourage of courtiers.36 On the one hand, this  re-organization of the court conspicuously 
benefited a handful of amirs and officials with clear pre-Yalbughā credentials, like 
Qashtamur al-Manṣūrī (ca. 1310-1369), a long-standing veteran of the Qalāwūnid era37; 
Aydamur al-Shāmī, a veteran from al-Nāṣir Ḥasan’s reign38, and Muḥammad b. Qumārī 
(d. 1377), whose father had been a leading amir in the 1330s and 40s39. On the other 
hand, upon gaining pre-eminence, the new “spokesmen” obviously also made sure to cash 
in and to include themselves in this round of promotions and new entries into al-Ashraf 
Shaʿbān’s court. Thus, Qajmās al-Ṭāzī, an amir of forty since March 1366, was appointed 
13
35 See al-Bayrūtī, fol. 4r; al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 147. Again in a reductive version in Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, 
fol. 4r (the fourth ‘odd’ amir, Ṭughāytamur al-Niẓāmī, is not mentioned, the verb (istaqarra - “to install”) is 
missing, and they were “ spokesmen for the untying and tying” only). Clear traces of a contemporary original 
may again be found in Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11: 40-1 (including reference to Ṭughāytamur and use of the 
verb istaqarra - “to install”). A different version, but equally referring to the three Yalbughāwī amirs, is in al-
Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:137 (“they started managing the affairs of the regime [akhadhū fī tadbīr umūr al-dawla]”).
36 al-Bayrūtī, fol. 4r-4v; al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 147. Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 4r-4v. Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3: 
138-9. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11: 41. On the classification of Mamluk military offices, see Van Steenbergen, 
Order Out of Chaos, 38-41; in this case, the ‘local’ nature of the December 1366 conflict, as well  as power 
politics —including direct access to and influence with the sultan— being its main issue, is borne out by the 
fact that this re-organization only involved court offices and high military ranks “in the sultan’s vicinity”, 
leaving the executive offices and the administration of the realm untouched.
37 He was a mamluk of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, promoted amir by Muḥammad’s son and successor 
al-Manṣūr Abū Bakr (r. 1341), who between 1341 and 1366 performed a host of minor and major executive 
functions in Egypt and Syria; on 15 December 1366, he was made ḥājib al-ḥujjāb (chief chamberlain) (see 
Khalīl  b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī, Kitāb al-Wāfī bi l-Wafayāt, Bibliotheca Islamic, vol. 6 (Wiesbaden, 1949-[1999]), 
24:246; Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 3: 249; Abū Bakr b. Aḥmad Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, ed. Adnan 
Darwich, Publications de l’Institut Français de Damas (Damascus, 1977-1994), 3: 353-4; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 
3:138; al-Bayrūtī, fol. 4r; al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 147; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 4r; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 
11:41). On the office of ḥājib al-ḥujjāb, see the references in Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 40, fn. 
65.
38 He had been made high-ranking amir and senior dawādār (personal secretary) in the latter half of al-Nāṣir 
Ḥasan’s reign; on 15 December 1366, he was again made high-ranking amir and senior dawādār (al-
Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:43, 138; al-Bayrūtī, fol. 4r; al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 147; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 4r; Ibn 
Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11:41). On the office of dawādār, see the references in Van Steenbergen, Order Out of 
Chaos, 40, fn. 65.
39 Muḥammad, an amir of forty since October 1363, was appointed amīr shikār (‘master of the hunt’) on 15 
December 1366 (see al-Bayrūtī, fol. 4v; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 4r [“amīr shikār al-sulṭān”]; al-
Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:138; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3:534). On the office of amīr shikār, see Aḥmad al-
Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshāʾ fī  Ṣināʿat al-Inshāʾ, (Cairo, 1913-1919), 4:22, 5:461; al-Ẓāhirī, Zubda, 114, 126. 
On his father, Qumārī al-Nāṣirī al-Kabir (d. 1346), see Khalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān al-ʿAṣr wa Aʿwān al-
Naṣr, eds. ʿA. Abū Zayd, N. Abū  ʿUmsha, M. Muwʿad & M. Sālim Muḥammad (Beirut-Damascus, 1998), 
4:132-3; al-Ṣafadī, Wāfī, 24:275.
amīr silāḥ (‘master of weaponry’)40; Aqbughā al-Aḥmadī al-Jalab, an amir of 100 since 
March 1366, was awarded —according to at least one report— the title and senior status 
of amir kabīr, “sitting in the audience hall above Asandamur al-Nāṣirī”41; and the latter, 
equally an amir of 100 since March 1366, at first remained a “spokesman” without an 
official title, but with court privileges concomitant with his newly acquired status, including, 
as just mentioned, the right to sit down in the sultan’s  presence. Furthermore, still in 
December 1366, a fourth member from that ‘gang’ of six, the amir Qarābughā al-
Ṣarghitmishī  was promoted to the highest rank —a very exceptional feat, as indicated by 
the explicit contemporary addendum that this happened ‘from the rank of amir of ten (mina 
l-ʿashra)’.42  Finally, other new or transferred court officers  were the amir of 100 Ṭaydamur 
al-Bālisī (d. 1377), the amir of 40 Asanbughā al-Qawṣūnī (d. 1374), and Qarātamur al-
Muḥammadī, an amir of 40, but again only since March 1366.43 In all, this  new, variegated 
composition of the court is  certainly also indicative of the fact that there were more amirs 
than just that ‘gang of six’ actively involved in the preceding conflict, as  equally suggested 
in the following obituary notice of an amir known as Uzdamur al-ʿIzzī (d. 1367), promoted 
amir of 10 by Yalbughā in March 1366: “he belonged to those that agreed to kill Yalbughā, 
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40 al-Bayrūtī, fol.4v; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 4v; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:117, 138; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, 
Nujūm, 11:41. On the office of amīr silāḥ, see the references in Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 
40-41, fn. 66.
41 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3: 298; his having been appointed amīr kabīr is confirmed from his biography in 
Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 1:391. On the position of amīr kabīr, see Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, p. 44, with 
additional references in fn. 82.
42  Al-Bayrūtī, fol. 4v; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 4v; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:139; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, 
Nujūm, 11:41 (making this comment even more explicit: “at once from the rank of amir of ten [dafʿatan 
wāḥidatan min imrat ʿashra]”; also Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 36-7. As for the two remaining 
members of the ‘gang’ of six, nothing further is mentioned in any source about the amir Aqbughā Jarkas Amīr 
Silāḥ, but Taghrī Birmish al-ʿAlāʾī, equally obscure, suddenly pops up once more in the accounts of March 
1367, three months after the December 1366 conflict, when this “Taghrī Birmish put on his war gear and rode 
out; but the amirs rode against him and caught him”, whereupon he was sent off to Alexandria (al-Bayrūtī, 
fol. 5r; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 5r [now with surplus (!) variant reading, and arguably more 
correct dating than al-Bayrūtī’s]; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11:42 [which his own enhanced version of the same 
story, linking this to the preceding arrest of ‘gang’ member Qarābughā al-Ṣarghitmishī]). It seems that the 
latter three amirs actually served in a more subordinate capacity as the ‘henchmen’ of this ‘gang’, 
considering the far less prominent role they were awarded in the conflict’s aftermath, including their very 
direct, even brutal involvement therein, as with Qarābughā’s bullying of one of Yalbughā’s former civil 
servants to extract money from him, or with Taghrī Birmish’ supervising the transfer of a group of arrested 
amirs to the prisons of Alexandria (al-Bayrūtī, fol. 4v; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 4v; al-Maqrīzī, 
Sulūk, 3:139).
43  Ṭaydamur, an amir of 100 since 1363 and formerly amīr silāḥ, was transferred to the office of ustādār 
(majordomo); Asanbughā, an amir of forty since 1365, was made the sultan’s lālā (tutor); Qarātamur was 
made the sultan’s khāzindār (treasurer) (al-Bayrūtī, fol. 4v; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 4v; al-
Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:139; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11:41. For biographies of these amirs, see Ibn Taghrī Birdī, 
Manhal, 7:39; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3:456, 525-6. On the offices of ustādār and khāzindār, see the 
references in Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 40-41, fn. 66.
and after his murder, he was given a rank of amir of 40”.44 Surely, this allegation similarly 
applied to more than just a handful of Yalbughāwī amirs for December 1366 !
In due course, the amir Asandamur al-Nāṣirī, left without a functional court position at this 
occasion, also managed to acquire for himself a more formally defined stake in the sultan’s 
court, for in the accounts for the summer of 1367 he starts appearing in the top office of 
atābak al-ʿasākir (commander of the army), formerly executed by Yalbughā al-Khāṣṣakī.45 
This, however, had everything to do with the fact that by that summer, the amir Asandamur 
had succeeded to overcome and eliminate these former Yalbughāwī associates of his, as 
well as other peers and contenders  for influence and authority. More precisely, two further 
political conflicts, one in March and one in June 1367, enabled Asandamur to finish off the 
authority of any other “spokesman” and, indeed, to “acquire the status of his ustādh 
Yalbughā, managing the affairs of the regime, issuing the appointments and dismissals  of 
its officials, and living in Yalbughā’s residence at al-Kabsh.”46 
Clearly and whatever the motives of each of those who stood up against Yalbughā in 
December 1366, it were amirs that took a leading role in and that benefited most 
prominently afterwards from this conflict. Moreover, as most sources did not fail to notice, 
most of these amirs, the ‘gang’ of six in particular, were of conspicuous Yalbughāwī 
signature, having Yalbughā’s  patronage and that they “had been promoted amir by him” in 
common.47 
Surprisingly, perhaps, the latter rather enigmatic source quotation turns  out to be 
extremely helpful in reconstructing the background of the December 1366 conflict. Indeed, 
almost each of the above-mentioned amirs owed his last promotion to Yalbughā and to his 
total re-organization of the regime’s elites less than a year before!
At that time, in late February 1366, Yalbughā had managed —as mentioned at the 
beginning of this article— to remove one of the last remaining obstacles for his  absolute 
pre-eminence, the amir Ṭaybughā al-Ṭawīl. After a violent confrontation outside Cairo 
between the supporters of both grandees, Ṭaybughā was sent to the prisons  of Alexandria. 
As Ibn Kathīr put it, recounting how this  “clash (waqʿa) between the amirs in Egypt” was 
conceived of in contemporary Damascus, “there was enormous uproar (khabṭa ʿaẓīma) in 
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44 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3: 326.
45 See e.g. al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 150; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11:46; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, 2:440.
46 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:141. On these conflicts, see Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 161-2, 194.
47 al-Bayrūtī, fol. 2v; al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 144.
Egypt, during which the amīr kabīr Yalbughā managed to keep his strength, support and 
backing.”48 Most importantly in the present context, Yalbughā’s supporters  were rewarded 
for their backing. Early March 1366, therefore, after the arrest of dozens of Ṭaybughā’s 
associates, Yalbughā appointed a host of new court officials, including the amir Ṭaydamur 
al-Bālisī, and at the same time he promoted two trusted fellows  to the rank of amir of 100: 
Aqbughā al-Aḥmadī al-Jalab and Asandamur al-Nāṣirī.49 In the case of Aqbughā, this  was 
his very first appearance in the sources, suggesting that he was promoted to the regime’s 
highest ranks from very humble origins, which was later explained as a result of “his 
belonging to Yalbughā’s mamluks  and of his having a privileged status with him”.50 
Moreover, the sources  describe how a few days later many mamluks and amirs were “all 
given a robe of honour and dressed with the sashes, upon which all came down from the 
Dār al-ʿAdl in the citadel [proceeding] to the Manṣūrīya madrasa, in Cairo’s Bayna al-
Qaṣrayn, where they were made to swear, as  is the custom [for the promotion of amirs].”51 
In fact, both al-Maqrīzī and Ibn Taghrī Birdī list with remarkable and conspicuous detail the 
names of all amirs that were thus rewarded:
“On Monday 9 March 1366, 38 amirs were promoted, among whom [the following 
were made] amirs of forty: Aqbughā al-Jawharī, Arghūn al-Qashtamurī, Aynabak al-
Badrī, ʿAlī al-Sayfī Kashlā (the wālī of Cairo), Ṭughāy Tamur al-ʿUthmānī, 
Alṭunbughā al-ʿIzzī, Qajmās al-Sayfī Ṭāz, Arghūn al-ʿIzzī Kunuk, Qarātamur al-
Muḥammadī, Urūs Bughā al-Khalīlī, Ṭājār min ʿ Awaḍ, Quṭlūbughā al-ʿIzzī, Aqbughā 
al-Yūsufī, Alṭunbughā al-Māridānī, Raṣlān al-Sayfī [Shaykhū] (who was established 
as ḥājib  of Alexandria), ʿAlī b. Qashtamur, Sūdūn al-Quṭluqtamurī, Quṭlūbughā al-
Shaʿbānī, Ṭughāy Tamur al-ʿIzzī and Muḥammad al-Tarjumān [al-Turkumānī]. The 
remainder [were made] amirs  of ten; they were: Kakbughā al-Sayfī [Baybughā], 
Ṭanbak al-Azqī, Arghūn al-Aḥmadī, Arghūn al-Arghūni, Sūdūn al-Shaykhūni, 
Uzdamur al-ʿIzzī, Urūs al-Niẓāmī, Yūnus al-ʿUmarī, Durtbughā al-Bālisī, Ṭūr Ḥasan, 
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48 Ismāʿīl  ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa l-Nihāya, (Beirut, 1990), 14:318-9; detailed accounts in al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 
3:115-6; al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 139-140; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11:31; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3:274-5.
49 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:117.
50 See Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3:298.
51 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:118.
Qarābughā al-Ṣarghitmishī, Ṭāz al-Ḥasanī, Qumārī al-Jamālī, Yūsuf Shāh, 
Ṭaqbughā al-ʿAlāʾī, Fīr ʿAlī, Qurqumās al-Ṣarghitmishī, and Ṭājār al-Muḥammadī.”52
Comprehensive lists such as this one, with details one would normally only expect in the 
regime’s administrative registers, are only rarely encountered in the era’s  chronicles.53 In 
the case of this  list, its  survival is extremely fortunate, as it offers an unusual, but insightful 
glimpse into the lower strata of the regime’s military hierarchy and its  socio-political 
allegiances. Many of the names mentioned here soon faded back into historiographical 
oblivion, in token of the distorting top-down view dominating Mamluk narrative source 
material.54 A handful of amirs, like Aqbughā al-Jawharī (1341-1390), Aynabak al-Badrī (d. 
1378), ʿAlī b. Qashtamur (d. 1381), Arghūn al-Aḥmadī (d. 1374) and Sūdūn al-Shaykhūnī 
(d. 1396) were to surface again as leading characters in the 1370s and beyond, and they 
are encountered here for the very first time.55  Finally, as  seen above and similar to their 
fortunate high-ranking colleagues Ṭaydamur, Aqbughā and Asandamur, there was a last 
group, including the fresh amirs of 40 Qajmās al-Ṭāzī and Qarātamur al-Muḥammadī and 
the new amirs of 10 Uzdamur al-ʿIzzī and Qarābughā al-Ṣarghitmishī, whose names were 
to resurface much quicker and much more prominently than anyone at the time might have 
17
52 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:117-8; also Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11:33-4. This round of promotions is also referred 
to in Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-ʿIbar, 5:455. No contemporary accounts of this conflict and its aftermath have 
survived, as extant fragments from the detailed chronicles of al-Bayrūtī and Ibn Duqmāq only start with the 
report for the hijrī-year 768 (starting in September 1366). Ibn Duqmāq’s summary world history only 
mentions the arrest of “about twenty amirs”, but not their replacement (Ibn Duqmāq, al-Jawhar al-Thamīn, 
413).
53 On the administrative registers, large parts of which consisted of the detailed listings of the names of iqṭāʿ 
holders, i.e. primarily of amirs, see Shihāb al-Dīn al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-Arab fī funūn al-Adab, (Cairo 
1931-1977), 8:200-13. For other examples of similar extant lists, see below, for the discussion of the June 
1367 list and for the reference to later lists (fn. 69, 108).
54 No further references in any of the contemporary sources was found to any of the following twelve amirs: 
ʿAlī al-Sayfī Kashlā, Arghūn al-ʿIzzī Kunuk, Raṣlān al-Sayfī, Sūdūn al-Quṭluqtamurī, Ṭughāy Tamur al-ʿIzzī, 
Muḥammad al-Tarjumān, Ṭūr Ḥasan, Qarābughā al-Ṣarghitmishī, Ṭāz al-Ḥasanī, Ṭaqbughā al-ʿAlāʾī, Fīr ʿAlī 
and Ṭājār al-Muḥammadī.
55 Aqbughā  would serve as a governor in several Syrian cities in the late 1370s and 1380s (Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 
1:391; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, 2:474-6); Aynabak was party to the rebellion against al-Ashraf Shaʿbān in 
1377 and briefly held power shortly thereafter (Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, 3:221-4; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 
3:558); ʿAlī was an amir of 100 and court official  between 1377 and 1381 (Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 3:96); the same 
goes for Arghūn, but from 1368 until  1374 (Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 1:351) and for Sūdūn, between 1381 and 1394 
(Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, 6:104-9; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 1:596-7).
expected.56 Most importantly, it becomes clear from all this that most of those Yalbughāwī 
amirs that instigated the December 1366 conflict did not only share the fact that they were 
all promoted thanks to Yalbughā’s patronage, but also that this had only happened very 
recently, in March 1366.
Moreover, apart from Yalbughā’s mamluk Aqbughā, the other rather striking feature 
common to those amirs that were opposing their patron in December 1366, is that despite 
such patronage none of them really had Yalbughā as his ustādh or original mamluk 
master, and that none of them therefore technically was a true member of the 
Yalbughāwīya.57  Thus, Asandamur’s mamluk origins lay with a further unknown 
Qalāwūnid, Mūsā b. al-Qardamīya b. al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, from whom sultan al-Nāṣir 
Ḥasan had acquired him, turning him into one of his own mamluks (hence his nisba al-
Nāṣirī); only after the latter’s deposition in 1361 had he been added to Yalbughā’s 
mamluks, who therefore technically was no more than Asandamur’s  patron or makhdūm, 
as  well as  his Nāṣirī peer (khushdāsh), instead of his master or ustādh.58 Furthermore, as 
their nisbas suggest, the other afore-mentioned ‘gang’ members Qajmās al-Ṭāzī and 
Qarābughā al-Ṣarghitmishī originally had been mamluks with the great political rivals of the 
early 1350s, the amirs Sayf al-Din Ṭāz al-Nāṣirī (d. 1362) and Sayf al-Din Ṣarghitmish al-
Nāṣirī (d. 1358) respectively.59  Finally, also in the case of most of the other known 
participating amirs in the December 1366 rebellion and its aftermath, like Uzdamur al- 
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56  Apart from Qajmās, Qarātamur, Uzdamur and Qarābughā, whose whereabouts have been mentioned, 
there were the amirs Arghūn al-Qashtamurī (d. 1368), who was an amir of 100 for a few months in 1367 (Ibn 
Ḥajar, Durar, 1:353-4), Ṭughāy Tamur al- ʿUthmānī (d. 1377), again amir of forty and then court official from 
1368 onwards (al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:228, 258, 161, 183), Ṭājār min ʿAwaḍ, arrested with Qarātamur al-
Manṣūrī in June 1367 (al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:143), Kakbughā al-Sayfī, briefly promoted amir of 40 and court 
official in the summer of 1368 (al-Bayrūtī, fol. 40r; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 42v), and Ṭanbak 
(also referred to as Ṭanaybak) al-Azqī (d. 1369), similarly an amir of 40 and court official, between 1368 and 
1369 (al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:161, 187).
57 On the bond between mamluks and their ustādh (coined ‘ustādhīya’), see Van Steenbergen, Order Out of 
Chaos, 88-92; for the classic study on the subject, see David Ayalon, L’Esclavage du Mamlouk, (Jerusalem, 
1951).
58 Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 1:386.
59  Biographical  information on Qajmās and Qarābughā is very obscure, since they were not deemed 
important enough to be awarded individual entries in any of the era’s biographical dictionaries, nor an 
obituary in any of the era’s chronicles. Their names are therefore all  there is to reconstruct some biographical 
information from (on Mamluk nisbas and their uses, see D. Ayalon, “Names, Titles and ‘Nisbas’ of the 
Mamlūks,” Israel Oriental Studies 5 (1975): 189-232, esp. 213-223).
ʿIzzī, Asanbughā al-Qawṣūnī and Ṭaydamur al-Bālisī, it is attested that they conspicuously 
shared similarly twisted Yalbughāwī origins.60
Interestingly, the same may also be inferred for most of those on the March 1366 list of 
Yalbughā’s newly promoted amirs. In most cases specific information on an amir’s origins 
remains wanting and linking the various nisbas in that list to those origins, as could be 
done for Qajmās and Qarābughā, quickly turns into an extremely hazardous exercise.61 
Nevertheless, such great variety already suggests that for the majority, just as for Qajmās 
and Qarābughā, their entry into Mamluk society has to be situated beyond the confines of 
Yalbughā’s household, most probably in the secondary households of preceding amirs of 
lower profile, rank or status. Nevertheless, for a handful of these amirs information on 
those mamluk origins has been preserved, indeed again confirming, as in the case of 
Uzdamur al-ʿIzzī, such non-Yalbughāwī background. It are more precisely the great 
households of Yalbughā’s political predecessors from the 1350s that emerge again as the 
cradles of the latter amirs’ careers, most notably those set up by Qalāwūnid magnates like 
Baybughā Rus al-Nāṣirī (d. 1353), Shaykhū al-ʿUmarī al-Nāṣirī (ca. 1303-1357), the afore-
mentioned Ṣarghitmish, and, once again, the Qalāwūnid sultan who managed to free 
himself from those magnates’ reins  in the late 1350s, Yalbughā’s own master al-Nāṣir 
Ḥasan.62
Apparently, in the 1360s there was a considerable pool of veteran mamluks available, 
stemming from a variety of high and low profile households that had dominated the 
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60  Uzdamur’s ustādh  was the amir Baktamur al-Muʾminī al-Wishāqī (d. 1370) (Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 1:355); 
Asanbughā was linked to the mamluk corps of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 
3:456); Ṭaydamur’s precise mamluk origins remain unknown, but the fact that he is said to have been 
“transferred in the executive offices before he became an amir of 100 and commander of 1000 in the year 65 
(1363)” suggests that his origins similarly lay beyond the Yalbughāwīya (Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3:525)
61 These many nisbas, derived from either the title (laqab) or the proper name (ism) of a mamluk’s master (or 
occasionally of his slave dealer) (see Ayalon, “Names, Titles, and Nisbas”, 213), are: al-Jawharī, al-
Qashtamurī, al-Badrī, al-Kashlāwi, al-ʿUthmānī, al-ʿIzzī, al-Muḥammadī, al-Khalīlī, al-Yūsufī, al-Quṭlūqtamuri, 
al-Niẓāmī, al-Bālisī, al-Ḥasanī, al-Jamālī, al-Shaʿbānī, al-Azqī, al-Aḥmadī, al-Arghūnī and al-ʿAlāʾī. They are 
all  either too common or too vague to allow for any positive identification of the masters they were referring 
to.
62 Three amirs, Raslān al-Sayfī, Yūnus al-ʿUmarī, and Sūdūn al-Shaykhūnī, may be positively linked to the 
household of Shaykhū al-ʿUmarī (al-Bayrūtī, fol. 40v; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 1:596-7; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, 
Nujūm, 11:33; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, 6:104-9); apart from Qarābughā, also Qurqumās’ nisba 
unequivocally suggests that he originated in Ṣarghitmish’ mamluk corps; Kakbughā al-Sayfī, also referred to 
as al-Sayfī Baybughā and al-Baybughāwi, originated most probably from among the mamluks of Baybughā 
Rūs (al-Bayrūtī, fol. 40r; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:161, 223); Alṭunbughā al-Māridānī was said to have been a 
mamluk of al-Nāṣir Ḥasan (Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3:417-8); and, finally, the amir Arghūn al-Aḥmadī is 
suggested to have had a career of some sorts predating Yalbughā by the statement that “he was transferred 
[in the services] until Yalbughā appointed him [in 1363] in the sultan’s service” (Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 1:351; Ibn 
Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3:438). On these Qalāwūnid magnates and their whereabouts in the 1350s, see Van 
Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 153-8.
preceding decades, but that all had ceased to exist one way or another in one of the 
several purges of Qalāwūnid magnates in the 1340s and 50s, or of al-Nāṣir Ḥasan in 
1361.63  Whereas by the 1360s their masters had thus disappeared and their direct access 
to the regime’s  resources and to rank and status had therefore been blocked, these 
mamluks were obviously still around, undoubtedly looking for alternative avenues of 
subsistence and socio-political participation. In later times, the standard pattern for this 
would have been their re-employment in a secondary unit of the sultan’s mamluks.64 In the 
14th century, however, such a formalized procedure is  not yet attested to and, considering 
the ephemeral status of the Qalāwūnid sultans  of the 1360, it is easy to imagine how at 
that time they yet ended up in the fresh but rapidly expanding corps’ of this decade’s  new 
magnates, including Yalbughā’s, that were only being established in the wake of the 
ascendance of the latter in the late 1350s and early 1360s.65 The by then supposedly still 
substantial numerical strength of these leaderless mamluks, stemming from regiments 
numbering a handful to many hundreds  of mamluks66, and their status  as “time-tested and 
battle-tried veterans” —as half a century later the sultan Muʾayyad Shaykh (1412-21) was 
to explain his employment of similar uprooted mamluks in his  service67— undoubtedly 
made that their new masters  welcomed them with open arms. They must have seemed 
extremely useful to these 1360s magnates to make up for the evident lack of military and 
political experience in their own relatively fresh mamluk corps’. These qualities were then 
clearly put to good use by these magnates to settle the new scramble for pre-eminence 
between 1361 and 1366, compensating those veteran mamluks for their support with 
promotions to military rank and status. Such is clearly borne out by one of the eventual 
outcomes of that scramble, the afore-mentioned March 1366 list naming Yalbughā’s 
supporters  that were thus compensated. That this pragmatic utilization and compensation 
of veteran mamluks in the 1360s was a general policy, practiced also by patrons other 
than Yalbughā, may be further derived from the names that were mentioned at that same 
occasion for the arrested supporters  of Yalbughā’s opponent Ṭaybughā al-Ṭawīl and that 
again hint at most of these associates’ variegated pre-1360s origins.
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63 See Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 153-8.
64 On this 15th century fate of an amir’s mamluks after his disappearance from the Mamluk scene, see David 
Ayalon, “Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army, I,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental  and African 
Studies 15 (1953): 204, 220-2, referring to al-Ẓāhirī, Zubda, 116.
65 See Van Steenbergen, “The Last of the Qalāwūnid Magnates?”.
66 See Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 89.
67 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 14:112; quoted here from a paraphrase of this text in Ayalon, “Studies-I”, 220.
[Ṭaybughā] was caught, as were his associates among the amirs, including Arghūn 
al-Isʿardī, Urūs al-Maḥmūdī, Kūkandāy, brother of Ṭaybughā al-Ṭawīl, Jariktamur al-
Sayfī Manjak, Arghūn min ʿAbd Allāh, Jumaq al-Shaykhūnī, Kilim, brother of 
Ṭaybughā al-Ṭawīl, Tulak, brother of Baybughā al-Ṣāliḥī, Aqbughā al-ʿUmarī al-Bālisī, 
Jirjī b. Kūkandāy, Uzramuk min Muṣṭafā, and Ṭashtamur al-ʿAlāʾī.68
Even after Yalbughā’s removal and the ascent to power of veteran mamluks from his corps 
in December 1366, this  pool continued to prove extremely apposite and appealing to these 
new patrons, lacking more than ever the time and means to set up proper corps that could 
be of any value in the power struggles that immediately ensued. Eventually, as mentioned, 
by June 1367 the veteran amir Asandamur al-Nāṣirī emerged victoriously and the radical 
change he once more is reported to have instilled on Egypt’s military hierarchy at this 
occasion, rewarding his supporters, reflects again the very similarly variegated and 
predominantly pre-1360s, non-Yalbughāwī background of the latter.
On 10 June 1367, a robe of honour was bestowed upon the following [newly 
promoted] amirs muqaddams alf: Uzdamur al-ʿIzzī Abū Daqn, appointed amīr silāḥ, 
Jariktamur al-Sayfī Manjak, appointed amīr majlis, Alṭunbughā al-Yalbughāwī, 
appointed raʾs nawba kabīr [and promoted] from the rank of amir of ten (mina l-
ʿashra) [to the rank of muqaddam alf], Quṭlūqtamur al-ʿAlāʾī, [appointed] amīr 
jāndār, Sulṭān [Shāh] b. Qārā, [appointed] ḥājib  thānī, Bayram al-ʿIzzī, [appointed] 
dawādār [and promoted to the rank of] muqaddam alf from the rank-and-file (mina l-
jundīya), and he was granted the iqṭāʿ of Ṭughāytamur al-Niẓāmī, as well as all the 
horses, textiles, mamluks, money, grain etc. that had been the latter’s. The following 
were made members of the sultan’s jūkāndārīya (‘masters  of the polo mallet’): 
Qarāmish al-Ṣarghitmishī, Mubārak al-Ṭāzī, and Īnāl al-Yūsufī. Tulaktamur al-
Muḥammadī was confirmed as khāzindār, as usual, and Bahādur al-Jamālī was 
made shādd al-dawāwīn, instead of Khalīl b. ʿArrām. Khalīl b. Qawṣūn was offered 
the rank of muqaddam alf, and Qunuq al-ʿIzzī and Arghūn al-Qashtamurī were 
[also] granted the rank of muqaddam alf.[...] Muḥammad b. Ṭayṭaq al-ʿAlāʾī, servant 
of Asandamur al-Nāṣirī, was granted a rank of muqaddam alf. The following were 
21
68 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11:31; also listed with slight variations in al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:116-7. For most of 
these 12 amirs, any further prosopographical information again remains wanting; only the pre-1366 
whereabouts of Urūs (d. 1373) and Jariktamur (d. 1375) are known, originating indeed in the corps’ of al-
Nāṣir Ḥasan and of the long-standing amir Manjak al-Yūsufī (ca. 1315-1375) respectively (Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, 
Tārīkh, 3:438, 490); additionally, it may be safely assumed that Jumaq’s nisba indicates that he stemmed 
from the household of the amir Shaykhū (d. 1357).
promoted to the rank of amir of forty by the sultan: Arghūn al-Muḥammadī al-Ānūkī 
al-Khāzin, Buzlār al-ʿUmarī, Arghūn al-Arghūni, Muḥammad b. Ṭaqbughā al-Mājārī, 
Bākīsh al-Sayfī Yalbughā, Sūdūn al-Sayfī Shaykhū, Aqbughā Āṣ al-Shaykhūnī, 
Kubak al-Ṣarghitmishī, Julbān al-Saʿdī, Īnāl al-Yūsufī, Kumushbughā al-Ṭāzī, 
Qumārī al-Jamālī, Baktamur al-ʿAlamī, Arslān Khujā, Mubārak al-Ṭāzī, Maliktamur 
al-Kashlāwī, Asanbughā al-ʿIzzī, Quṭlūbughā al-Ḥalabī and Maʾmūr al-Qalamṭāwī. 
[The following were promoted to] the rank of amir of ten: Alṭunbughā al-Maḥmūdī, 
Qarābughā al-Aḥmadī, Kizil al-Arghūnī, Ḥājjī Bak b. Shādī, ʿAlī b. Baktāsh, Rajab b. 
Khiḍr and Ṭayṭaq al-Rammāḥ.”69
Nevertheless, the employment of veteran mamluks also entailed some serious 
disadvantages. As suggested by Ibn Taghrī Birdī on a similar, but much later situation,
they are as nothing, for they generally follow the majority; none of them is tied to any 
particular ruler, but they serve whoever happens to ascend the throne much in the 
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69  Al-Bayrūtī, 5v-6. With only slight variation, indicating again an obvious textual interdependence, in Ibn 
Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, 5v-6. Also very similar listings in al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:144-5; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, 
Nujūm, 11:44-5. Also present in al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 149, but in a summary format (referring only to the first three 
high-ranking amirs and their new positions). On the court offices of amīr silāḥ, raʾs nawba kabīr, amīr jāndār, 
and khāzindār, see the references in Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 40-41, fn. 65 & 66; on the 
secondary court positions of ḥājib thānī, shādd al-dawāwīn, and jūkāndār, see Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Qalqashandī, 
Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā fī Ṣināʿat al-Inshāʾ, (Cairo, 1913-19), 4: 22, 5:458; al-Ẓāhirī, Zubda, 114, 115.
This June 1367 list indeed looks very similar to the March 1366 list as far as the diverse, pre-1360s 
background of the majority of these amirs is concerned. Both lists have lots of different pre-1360 nisbas in 
common (besides the most conspicuous and suggestive nisbas al-Ṣarghitmishī, al-Ṭāzī and al-Shaykhūnī, 
these are al-Qashtamurī, al-Kashlāwi, al-ʿIzzī, al-Muḥammadī, al-Jamālī, al-Aḥmadī, al-Arghūnī and al-
ʿAlāʾī.); they moreover also share the amirs Uzdamur al-ʿIzzī, Arghūn al-Arghūni, Sūdūn al-Shaykhūni, 
Qumārī al-Jamālī and Jariktamur al-Sayfī Manjak, whose veteran status has been discussed before. Apart 
from all this, the origins for six more amirs on this list can moreover be positively located in preceding, 
vanished households; they are Bayram al-ʿIzzī (a former mamluk of the amir ‘Izz al-Din Tuqtay al-Nāṣirī 
(1319-1358) who was now not just granted high rank, but also the household means to perform that rank’s 
demands [see Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 1:514; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3:327]), Mubārak al-Ṭāzī (as his nisba 
indicates, he stemmed from the household of the afore-mentioned Qalāwūnid magnate Ṭāz al-Nāṣirī [see 
Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Inbā  ʾ al-Ghumr bi  Abnā  ʾ al-ʿUmr fī  Tārīkh, ed. M. ʿAbd al-Muʿīd Khān (Beirut, 1986), 
1:287], Bahādur al-Jamālī (whose mamluk origins went back to the household of al-Malik al-Nāṣir 
Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn [Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 1:496], Khalīl b. Qawṣūn (son of the illustrious Qawṣūn al-Nāṣirī 
[d. 1342], who made career in the reign of al-Nāṣir Ḥasan [Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, 5:280]), Arghūn al-
Muḥammadī al-Ānūkī (as his nisba indicates, he had been a mamluk of Ānūk b. Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn [d. 
1340] [Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3:489]), and Buzlār al-ʿUmarī (a former mamluk of al-Nāṣir Ḥasan [Ibn 
Ḥajar, Durar, 1:476; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, 3:361]). In all, this list of 39 beneficiaries of the June 1367 
round of promotions still only mentions four genuine members of the Yalbughāwīya (Alṭunbughā al-
Yalbughāwī, Īnāl  al-Yūsufī, Bākīsh al-Sayfī Yalbughā and Maʾmūr al-Qalamṭāwī [on their unambiguous 
Yalbughāwī origins, see Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, 3:70, 190; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 12: 122; Ibn Qāḍī 
Shuhba, Tārīkh, 1: 362, 3:327; Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmi  ʿ li  Ahl al-Qarn 
al-Tāsiʿ, (Beirut, 1992), 2:320]).
manner of the popular dictum: ‘Whosoever marries my mother, to him I cry: “O my 
father”.’70
The pragmatic, opportunist and second-hand nature of the ties  that bound most of these 
veteran mamluks and amirs to their new households seriously conditioned their loyalty to 
their patrons. Most importantly, new opportunities and a change of fortune were bound to 
affect those ties. Thus, one might speculate, there was little to prevent some from not 
trying their luck against Yalbughā in December 1366, when differences of opinion on the 
treatment of his mamluks were emerging and an opportunity arose near Gizeh to attack 
him by surprise. Certainly, most amirs at first decided to join forces with Yalbughā to quell 
a rebellion that only a handful of them had started anyway and that seemed too remote 
and isolated to succeed. There even were a handful of rebellious amirs who regretted their 
initial actions  against Yalbugha and who still managed to cross over to Cairo, including 
“some of his mamluks whom he had made amir, like Aqbughā al-Jawharī, Kumushbughā 
and Yalbughā Shuqayr”.71  But when the rebels managed to involve the sultan and, quite 
unexpectedly, to return to the citadel with him and turn the conflict’s  tide, there similarly 
was little to prevent the great majority of amirs  from changing sides, so that sources 
observed how eventually
Yalbughā’s associates slipped away, batch after batch, and Yalbughā was forced to 
flee. [...] He mounted his horse and left for his  residence at al-Kabsh […] while the 
common people were making fun of him and were calling him names, all the way 
until he reached his residence.72
Junior mamluks
While a composite group of freshly promoted veterans clearly took the lead in the 
December 1366 rebellion and its aftermath, this surely does not invalidate the assertion 
most commonly found that it were Yalbughā’s non-promoted mamluks that stood up 
against their master. Most importantly, all source descriptions of the conflict agree that it 
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70 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Extracts from Abû 'l-Maḥâsin ibn Taghrî Birdî's Chronicle Entitled Ḥawâdith ad-Duhûr fî 
Madâ 'l-Ayyâm wash-Shuhûr, ed. William Popper, University of California Publications in Semitic Philology, 
vol. 8 (Berkeley, 1930-42), 3:443; translation quoted from Ayalon, “Studies-I,” 220.
71  See al-Bayrūtī, fol. 3r; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 3r; al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 145. Aqbughā was a 
member of the Yalbughāwīya (see Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Manhal, 2:474), as was Kumushbughā said to have 
been, though his mamluk origins really lay elsewhere (see al-Sakhāwī, Ḍawʾ, 6:230 “the son of the lord of 
Ḥamā had bought him when he was a young boy; he raised him and then presented him to al-Nāṣir Ḥasan; 
after Ḥasan’s murder Yalbughā al-ʿUmarī took him and made him a raʾs nawba with him”). No further 
information has survived on Yalbughā Shuqayr.
72 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:135-6. Variant reading in al-Bayrūtī, fol. 3v; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 3v.
were mamluks that bore the brunt of the action, including Yalbughā’s eventual lynching, 
and, as suggested above, Yalbughā’s harsh disciplining undoubtedly convinced many of 
them to go along with those bold and defiant amirs and act against their master.
But as  with the amirs  above, and even more so in this context of Yalbughā’s numerous 
mamluks, the question that remains to be answered is  whether such an unusually 
insubordinate attitude was similarly adopted by all of them at the same time, for the similar 
reasons, or in similar fashion. In fact, a detailed analysis of the sources’ representations of 
the role those mamluks really played in the December 1366 conflict and its aftermath adds 
a number of significant nuances to the overall picture. 
After Yalbughā had barely escaped the amirs’ attack while he was encamped at Gizeh, al-
Maqrīzī details the reaction of his mamluks in particular as follows:
when they learned about Yalbughā’s  escape, they announced that ‘whoever wants 
his makhdūm Yalbughā, should follow him, and who wants the sultan, should stay 
with us.’ So a group (ṭāʾifa) followed Yalbughā, while most of them remained 
behind. The latter then hastened towards those who had defected them and they 
overcame and enchained them, dividing everything they had brought with them 
among each other.73 
Clearly, not all of Yalbughā’s mamluks had been equally ill disposed towards their master 
at the start of the conflict, at least according to the later historian al-Maqrīzī. Furthermore, 
this  author suggested in a similar vain that thereafter “a group of his intimates” (nafar min 
khāṣṣatihi) escaped to Cairo with him and that he then managed to rally “amirs and rank-
and-file” (mina l-umarāʾ wa l-ajnād) around him in Cairo, spending the night with this “troop 
of his” (bi-jamʿihi) in his residence at al-Kabsh.74  
Suggestions like these that at least some of Yalbughā’s mamluks maintained their loyalty 
certainly gain in credibility when in the hours and days following the outbreak of the conflict 
Yalbughā’s manifest and impressive resilience —including the enthronement of a new 
sultan— is taken into consideration. In the volatile Mamluk political climate of this era, 
where “shortage of men” was considered “the worst possible merchandise” (qillat al-rijāl 
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73 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:132.
74  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:131, 132. Very tellingly, Ibn Taghrī Birdī explains the enigmatic “a group of his 
intimates” by clarifying that they were “his intimates from among his mamluks” (Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 
11:36).
akhass biḍāʿa)75, this would have been extremely difficult for anyone to materialize without 
any numerically persuasive support from one’s own mamluk regiment.
Finally, the same consideration similarly lends validity and weight to al-Maqrīzī’s detailed 
representation of the conflicts’ final hours  on Saturday 12 December 1366. Whereas, as 
referred to above, most sources flatly claim that Yalbughā’s end was drawing nigh when all 
amirs fled his party and “there was no one left with him”76, al-Maqrīzī adds that also “his 
mamluks fled one after the other (farra mamālīkuhu shayʾan baʿda shayʾin)” and that in 
spite of this “a mere 100 horsemen yet remained with him (wa lam yabqa maʿahu illā dūna 
l-mīʾa fāris)” until he got arrested.77
It may therefore be convincingly argued that in December 1366 Yalbughā was not just 
opposed by, amongst others, mamluks  who all identified themselves as  members of his 
Yalbughāwīya, but that at the same time a substantial number of rank-and-file maintained 
their loyalty, and that the latter group undoubtedly equally included such Yalbughāwīya. 
Only in the course of the four days this conflict lasted, therefore, and in particular when al-
Ashraf Shaʿbān decided to join the rebels’ cause and managed to return to Cairo, 
Yalbughā’s chances to emerge victoriously evaporated and most of his  supporters from 
the Yalbughāwīya left him, as did the amirs, deciding the conflict to the detriment of their 
patron.
Unlike those promoted veterans, however, Yalbughā’s  non-promoted mamluks did not 
benefit at all from the conflict’s outcome, whatever their initial stand. Actually, the 
precipitate fall of their patron may have done them more harm than good, for with his 
decapitation, they may have solved the alleged problem of their maltreatment, but at the 
same time a new, much bigger problem appeared. Since Yalbughā, as their employer, had 
been the guardian of their access to income and further resources, their killing of him, 
almost as in a moment of insanity, had in fact deprived them of legitimate leadership, 
social status and secure income. They, as it were, had severed the links that had 
embedded them within Mamluk society and that had offered them warrants  for their own 
future. There is a hint at a new round of promotions a few weeks after Yalbughā’s death, 
when al-Maqrīzī, just as in March 1366, describes how “on Thursday 21 January 1367, the 
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75  Shams al-Dīn al-Shujāʿī, Tārīkh al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn al-Ṣāliḥī  wa Awlādihi, ed. B. 
Schäfer (Wiesbaden, 1977), 1:173; Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 91.
76  Al-Bayrūtī, fol. 3v; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 3v; al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 146; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 
11:39.
77 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:135, 136.
group of amirs came down from the citadel [proceeding] to the Manṣūrīya madrasa, where 
they were made to swear and [where] they were dressed with the sashes, as is the custom 
[for the promotion of amirs].”78  Unfortunately, in this case no names are mentioned. Yet, 
considering the afore-mentioned pattern of promotions on similar occasions, as well as the 
corps’ subsequent history, only a handful of Yalbughā’s mamluks, if any at all, may have 
benefited from this round.
In the months after December 1366, therefore, the majority of Yalbughā’s non-promoted 
mamluks were forced to try and find ways to overcome a certain destiny on the edge of 
Mamluk society, either spreading terror in Cairo’s  streets and looting what they could no 
longer legitimately acquire, or seeking new employment and hiring their services to new 
patrons, hoping for suitable rewards.79  Thus, to mention but one example, immediately 
after the conflict, on 16 December 1366, one close companion of Yalbughā, the amir 
Aynabak al-Badrī, avoided his arrest and obtained rehabilitation, not just by “sending a lot 
of money to the amirs”, but also by “offering to every one of [Yalbughā’s] mamluks 1000 
silver dirhams, which at that time was equivalent to more than 50 mithqāl in gold”, in token 
of their aggressive, fearful reputation in those days, but also of the opportunities their 
precarious position offered.80 
Eventually, the one who according to all sources best managed to make use of those 
opportunities was  the afore-mentioned veteran Asandamur al-Nāṣirī, who succeeded more 
than any of his peers to portraying himself a credible substitute for the Yalbughāwīya 
mamluks’ murdered ustādh and patron. Hence, by early June 1367, when this evolution of 
re-grouping and re-employment came full circle, Yalbughā’s  mamluks are all presented as 
playing a key role in Asandamur’s afore-mentioned ousting of his veteran peers.81
Now, it has already been established that an important part within those Yalbughāwīya 
ranks was reserved for mamluks of a veteran status, either gaining rank and status  in the 
course of the years 1366 and 1367, or being forced once again to seek new employment 
after December 1366, in both cases surely loosing their Yalbughāwī-status for reasons of 
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78 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:140.
79 For ample source references to their violent engagements in Cairo in the course of 1367, see al-Bayrūtī, 
fol. 5r-5v, 37r-38r, 42; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 5r-5v, 40r-41r; Ibn Khaldūn, ʿIbar, 5:457, 458, 
461-2; al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 148-9, 152-3, 154; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:141, 142-3, 150-1, 153-4; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, 
Tārīkh, 3: 295, 296, 309-11, 326, 327; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11:42-4, 47-9, 103.
80 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:139.
81  See al-Bayrūtī, fol. 5r-5v; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 5r-5v; Ibn Khaldūn, ʿIbar, 5:457; al-ʿAynī, 
“ʿIqd”, 148-9; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3: 142-3; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11: 42.
irrelevance. What is  very interesting in the same context, however, is that source reports 
for what happened after the December 1366 rebellion hint with increasing explicitness at a 
crucial common identifying feature for those Yalbughāwīya that continued to be labeled as 
such, even after their ustādh’s demise. In his account of the December 1366 rebellion, al-
Maqrīzī, in fact, already defined the rebellious mamluks very precisely as Yalbughā’s  “ajlāb 
mamluks (mamālīkuhu al-ajlāb)”, even clarifying at one point that their number had been 
no less 1800.82 To my knowledge, this is in fact the very first time the sources generically 
apply the term ‘ajlāb’, which is well known from 15th century Mamluk history to denote a 
royal corps’ last import of mamluks, but quite unusual for preceding periods. Al-Maqrīzī, 
however, is the only one among the chroniclers to use the term in the context of this 
December 1366 rebellion, which suggests that it may well be an anachronism from the first 
half of the fifteenth century, when this historian was writing his chronicle and when use of 
the term, especially in the context of multifarious local problems with the sultan’s junior 
mamluks, indeed became ubiquitous in the era’s historiography.83
Nevertheless, also in his description of Yalbughā’s mamluks’ continued search for 
alternative patronage after December 1366, al-Maqrīzī persists in frequently applying the 
term ‘ajlāb’. 84   Moreover, from the accounts on early June 1367 onwards, when as 
mentioned this search ended in Asandamur employing these mamluks’ services  to impose 
his authority, the term ‘ajlāb’ gradually comes to be used by all sources alike. At first, in the 
course of that June 1367 actions  of Asandamur against his peers, the contemporaries al-
Bayrūtī and Ibn Duqmāq, and Ibn Taghrī Birdī with them, still used the common 
denominator “Yalbughā’s malicious mamluks (mamālīk Yalbughā al-ashrār)” for those 
whom al-Maqrīzī grouped in the same context under the term ‘ajlāb’.85  After that point in 
the sources’ historical chronologies, however, ‘ajlāb’ seems the appropriate term, applied 
by all sources alike to denote Asandamur’s new rank-and-file supporters who continued to 
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82 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:130, 139.
83 See Ayalon, “Studies-I,” 204, 206-13 (207: “In the Circassian period, a new name for the mamluks of the 
ruling sultan appears which becomes more frequent than mushtarawāt, without displacing it entirely, viz. 
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Circassian Mamluks,” in The Cambridge History of Egypt, Volume 1, Islamic Egypt, 640-1517, ed. Carl  F. 
Petry (Cambridge, 1998), 295, 300-2, 309-10; Amalia Levanoni, “The Sultan’s Laqab - a sign of a new order 
in mamluk factionalism”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society, eds. Michael  Winter & Amalia 
Levanoni, The Medieval Mediterranean, vol. 51 (Leiden, 2004), 79-116. 
84 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:141, 142, 150, 152, 153-5.
85 al-Bayrūtī, fol. 5r; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 5r; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11:42.
prove extremely difficult to control.86  Even Ibn al-Furāt (1134/5-1405), for instance, 
mentions how eventually “al-Ashraf Shaʿbān was  victorious over the ‘ajlāb’ mamluks of the 
amir Yalbughā al-Khāṣṣakī (al-ajlāb mamālīk al-amīr Yalbughā al-Khāṣṣakī) and arrested 
the amir Asandamur al-Nāṣirī.”87  Another contemporary, al-Nuwayrī al-Iskandarānī (d. 
1372), also used this  term in a similarly telling way in his passing reference to these events 
of late 1367:
the common people had come to the aid of the sultan al-Malik al-Ashraf Shaʿbān 
during the operation of the ajlāb mamluks (fi ḥarakat al-mamālīk al-ajlāb) [...], when 
they intended to cause trouble for the sultan, in conjunction with the amir Asandamur 
al-Khāṣṣakī [...]. But the common people were mobilized, killing the ajlāb  and making 
them bite the dust.88 
In a very curious and puzzling addendum, the same author even explains such disturbing 
events by claiming that upon examination of these defeated ‘ajlāb’, it turned out that 
they had their foreskins intact and were not circumcised (wa hum ghulf bi-ghayr 
khitān), by which it became known that they were Christians who keep away from the 
true faith (naṣārā baʿīdūn ʿan al-īmān).89
It has been convincingly argued before how one should be very wary of treating al-
Nuwayrī al-Iskandarānī and his literary compendium as  a historical source, on its key 
event of the Alexandrian crusade as much as on any other contemporary occurrence.90 
This  ‘islamicized’ and at once also surprising explanation for the turmoil of the year 1367 
certainly warrants this kind of historiographical wariness. At the same time, however, it is 
doubtful that such an explanation has no bearing whatsoever with the historical reality of 
the late 1360s which its author was living and writing in; it should certainly not be excluded 
that in essence it represents  one way or another a version of the story of these ‘ajlāb’ as 
that was being told and retold in contemporary Alexandria.91 At the very least, al-Nuwayrī’s 
28
86 Al-Bayrūtī, fol. 40r; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 40r; Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-ʿIbar, 5:457, 458, 472; 
al-ʿAynī, “ʿIqd”, 152; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 11:47.
87 Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Ibn al-Furāt, Tārīkh Ibn al-Furāt, eds. Qusṭanṭīn Zurayq & Najlā 
ʿIzz al-Dīn (Beirut, 1936-1942), 9: 319.
88 Al-Nuwayrī al-Iskandarānī, Kitāb al-Ilmam, 6: 18.
89 Al-Nuwayrī al-Iskandarānī, Kitāb al-Ilmam, 6: 18.
90 Weintrit, Formen spätmittelalterlichen islamischer Geschichtsdarstellung.
91 Furthermore, in the context of literary topoi, there seems to exist an intriguing degree of similarity between 
this contemporary assessment of the ‘ajlāb’ as Christians and reports by European travellers to the Mamluk 
sultanate that portray all mamluks as Christian renegades (cfr. Ulrich Haarmann, “The Mamluk System of 
Rule in the Eyes of Western Travellers”, MSR 5 (2001): esp. 6-16).
remark hints at the extremely negative perception of these ‘ajlāb’ by contemporaries by the 
time he was writing up his work.92 Furthermore, in conjunction with the other contemporary 
and later authors’ common use of ‘ajlāb’ in their accounts of the events of the summer and 
autumn of 1367, there can be no doubt that there was at the time a distinctive body at 
work in Cairo that was identifiable by a generic term that explicitly linked them to 
Yalbughā’s leaderless junior mamluks and to the December 1366 rebellion and its  chaotic 
aftermath.
In general, it should come as no surprise that the 1360s did not only provide contenders 
for power with a recruitment pool of ready-made veteran mamluks of various  stock, but 
also with sufficient opportunities to acquire the usual junior rank-and-file recruits, firmly tied 
to their own ustādh’s patronage only.93  However, as far as Yalbughā is concerned this 
traditional building block of a magnate’s Mamluk household was expanded to a giant 
scale, reaching massive dimensions of, allegedly, 1500 to 1800 juniors.94  Numerically, 
therefore, his personal corps of mamluks, including veterans as well as these ajlāb, surely 
outdid any of his contemporaries, with the later historian Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba claiming that 
“one of [the contemporary historians95] stated that it was said that he had three thousand 
mamluks”.96  In fact, this more than anything else is what Yalbughā continued to be 
remembered for long after his death, so that eventually Ghars al-Dīn al-Ẓāhirī (d. 1468), in 
his administrative manual, considered it still apposite to include a reference to that rather 
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93 On the links between junior mamluks and their ustādh, see Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 88-92; 
for the classic study on the subject, see Ayalon, L’Esclavage du Mamlouk, esp. 27-9.
94 al-Bayrūtī, fol. 37v; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-Anām”, fol. 37v; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:151 (1500), 139 (1800).
95 This may well  refer to Ibn al-Furāt (d. 1405), whose chronicle for these years is lost, but who was a well-
attested source for Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba (see David Reisman, “A Holograph MS of Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah’s “Dhayl””, 
MSR 2 (1998): esp. 29-42.)
96 Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3:306.
than to any other historical number of mamluks, claiming that Yalbughā even had had 
“3500 mamluks in his service, one of them being al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Barqūq who was still a 
junior (saghīran) at the time”.97
This  quote equally reminds  once more of the fact that by 1366 these Yalbughāwīya ranks 
were still made up in large part by juniors  like Barqūq. In view of this  junior status, not yet 
having completed their training, most of his corps surely was still more of a liability than an 
asset to Yalbughā, even despite its  numerical strength. Hence, as detailed above, his  and 
his colleagues’ pragmatic employment of veterans in the same ranks. In fact, the 
questionable political and military usefulness of the junior mamluks that made up those 
ranks may be further inferred from the fact that many seem to have been acquired only 
quite shortly before 1366. Thus, according to one biographical note, Barqūq was only 
imported and bought from a slave merchant in the course of the year 1363.98  Indeed, the 
generic term ‘ajlāb’ (recent imports) by which this Barqūq and the many hundreds of his 
consorts eventually became known in the streets of Cairo and beyond suggests that his 
was not a unique case.
At the same time, however, this Barqūq and the other ‘ajlāb’ whose biographies have 
survived (like Ibn Khaldūn’s eyes and ears Alṭunbughā al-Jūbānī, or the patron of today’s 
famous Khān al-Khalīlī in Cairo, Jarkas al-Khalīlī) were surprisingly older than one would 
expect of junior mamluks like this, as they were all said to have been born around the year 
1340 and therefore already in their twenties when they became mamluks.99 In view of the 
career of their ustādh Yalbughā and his  quickly rising political star, especially after the 
murder of sultan Ḥasan in 1361, it can be quite convincingly suggested that it must have 
been for reasons  of impatient ambition, peer rivalry, and concomitant time pressures, that 
Yalbughā acquired his own mamluks at such an advanced age, attempting to transform 
them into a useful army in the shortest time possible by subjecting these novices to 
spartan training methods and relentless discipline. Undoubtedly, Yalbughā’s intentions and 
his ajlāb’s training were cut short by the December 1366 conflict. This policy’s partial 
success would nevertheless show again when the survivors among these ‘ajlāb’, including 
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99  See, for references to their age, al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:476; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 12:120; Ibn Qāḍī 
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Barqūq, were allowed to return to Cairo in 1373 “to train [al-Ashraf Shaʿbān’s] 
mamluks.”100  
Overall, however, by 1366 their training and experience were still deemed insufficient, 
despite their numerical usefulness for Yalbughā’s  political muscle. When therefore in the 
course of Yalbughā’s struggle for pre-eminence support and loyalty had to be rewarded 
and ranks redistributed, as in March 1366, it were in general not these junior 
Yalbughāwīya that benefited. As detailed above, in view of their expertise of considerable 
years, their more veteran status and perhaps also their much more artificial household 
membership, it were Yalbughā’s  veteran mamluks that were almost automatically preferred 
for promotion. Only in a very few cases, juniors already managed to break into the military 
ranks, but these are exceptions that rather seem to confirm the general rule. As mentioned 
before, Aqbughā al-Aḥmadī (quite tellingly nicknamed ‘al-jalab’), for instance, was made 
an amir of 100 in March 1366, but this seems primarily to have been the result of “his 
having a privileged status with Yalbughā”.101 
When this factor of numerous very junior Yalbughāwīya mamluks is  taken into 
consideration for the December 1366 conflict and its background, it becomes clear that 
dissatisfaction with their harsh training played an important role in inducing these ‘ ajlāb’ to 
take part in it. Moreover, so did surely also frustrations with what those veterans in their 
corps were already achieving while, despite their mature age, most of the ‘ajlāb’ were still 
reckoned too junior for that.102
All in all, however, whatever the role of such ‘ajlāb’ frustrations, it seems that all sorts of 
practicalities, including even the Nile, were surely as much of a decisive factor in the 
course the conflict took for the Yalbughāwīya, as Yalbughā’s relentless and selective 
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100 Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-ʿIbar, 5:462.
101 See Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Tārīkh, 3:298.
102 In this context, it is worthwhile to compare with the case of, for instance, the amir Uljībughā al-Muẓaffarī 
al-Khāṣṣakī, who was said to have been only nineteen when he died in 1349, and who despite that young 
age already had been a leading amir in Cairo and a governor of the province of Tripoli (al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān, 
1:594-8; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, 10: 216 [“his moustache had not yet come out”]); a less extreme, more 
mainstream and equally interesting example concerns that of the amir Maliktamur al-Ḥijāzī (d. 1347), who 
was already mentioned as an amir in Cairo in 1333 (see Mūsā b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Yūsufī, Nuzhat al-
Nāẓir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir, ed. A. Ḥuṭayṭ, [Beirut, 1986], 179) that is, when he was in his early twenties, 
as suggested by paleopathological investigations of his remains in his burial crypt in Cairo (“These bones 
belong to the male of massive morphological structure in good state of health, most probably of the White 
Variety, 173 cm tall. His age at death was 35-40 years.” [Tadeusz Dzierzykray-Rogalski, Jerzy Kania & 
Medhat al-Minabbawi, “The investigations of burial crypts in the mausoleum of princess Tatar al-Ḥiğāziyya in 
Cairo,”  Annales Islamologiques 23 (1987): 83, 84]). That these examples date back two to three decades 
from the situation of the ʻ ajlābʼ is, in fact, revealing for the profound changes that are occurring (see below).
patronage may have been. First of all, considering that Yalbughā had only gone to al-
Gizeh in December 1366 for a hunting party, it is highly unlikely that his entire corps of 
mamluks crossed the Nile with him, especially in view of its infamously giant size. 
Obviously, sufficient numbers had been left in or near his residence at al-Kabsh to prove 
extremely useful when, after the failed attempt against his life, he hastily returned with only 
a handful of his intimates. Secondly, changing camps was not made easy for those 
Yalbughāwīya mamluks that had been left near Gizeh, considering Yalbughā’s instant 
blockade of the Nile; as mentioned earlier, some amirs  and “mamluks he had promoted” 
still did manage to cross and switch back to Yalbughā’s side on Friday, but most that tried 
failed and, as stated by al-Maqrīzī, fell in the hands of their rebellious peers.103  
In all this, however, fear for Yalbughā’s retaliation rather than any type of maltreatment 
seems to have been the driving force behind these and most other actions of the latter. 
Anxieties about their treatment may have easily tricked many of the Yalbughāwīya-
mamluks in Gizeh into their promoted veteran colleagues’ scheme, but when this failed 
and Yalbughā escaped, leaving them cut off from the centre of power on the Nile’s ‘wrong’ 
side, the following painful observation by one later historian may indeed have guided their 
further actions:
When they realized that their ustādh had saved himself and [that] he had fled, they 
became extremely worried (ishtadda takhawwufuhum) that when he would overcome 
them thereafter, he would not leave any of them alive (lā yubqī minhum aḥadan).104
Such fears, undoubtedly most vivid among those of Yalbughā’s ‘ajlāb’ who had been at 
Gizeh with him, obviously did not materialize. Nevertheless, they eventually did to some 
extent become a reality for all of Yalbughā’s ‘ajlāb’. With the loss of their ustādh and their 
training incomplete, they did as a matter of fact experience death in financial, social and 
political terms. When this was realized by them, and when hiring their numerically useful 
services to Asandamur and to his peers in 1367 did not seem to result in any lasting 
change of fortune nor again in sufficient tangible rewards, unlike once more for the veteran 
mamluks, the consequences were dearly felt in Cairo’s streets  and palaces. Going totally 
out of control, especially after June 1367 and another missed round of rewards and 
promotions, they started looting and attacking whatever and whoever they could lay their 
hands on, and no one, not even Asandamur, seemed willing or capable to revert that 
situation. It is this process which goes a long way to explaining how there gradually was 
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generated a public and very negative awareness of their distinctive identity as  Yalbughā’s 
junior mamluks, or his ‘ajlāb’, as attested to by source reports. The immediate outcome of 
this  parallel formation of a hateful public opinion of them surely can be read in the 
remarkable bad press they received from al-Nuwayrī.105  In the longer run, however, this 
abusive tone was moderated, reflecting in fact the lasting change of fortune which a 
number of these ‘ajlāb’ did eventually experience. Hence, in a much milder and rather 
functional account, al-Maqrīzī (once more inspired by the very similar remarks of Ibn 
Khaldūn) presents the final, but in his version also rather purifying, whereabouts  of 
Yalbughā’s junior mamluks as follows:
“On Thursday 14 [October 1367], the sultan drowned a group from the 
Yalbughāwīya mamluks, who had agreed to kill him, in the Nile […] In the morning 
of this Thursday, 100 of the notables of these ajlāb  Yalbughāwīya (al-ajlāb al-
Yalbughāwīya) were nailed and cut in two. A group of them were drowned. The 
remainder of them were banished to Syria and to Aswan. Among those of the 
Yalbughāwīya that were banished were Barqūq, Barka, Alṭunbughā al-Jūbānī, 
Jarkas al-Khalīlī and Aqbughā al-Māridānī. The sharīf Baktamur, wālī of Cairo, took 
them and detained them in his house, their hands fixed in wood. His lunch came, 
but he did not give them anything to eat. He assigned over them someone to take 
them to Qaṭyā. The wālī of Qaṭyā took them and sent them to Ghazza. Its  governor 
sent them to al-Karak. They were imprisoned in a dark pit, in its citadel, for several 
years. Then they were released and they went to Damascus, where they served the 
amir Manjak, nāʾib  al-Shām, until the sultan called for the Yalbughāwīya mamluks to 
employ them in the service of his  two sons. So Barqūq served amongst the others 
that were in the service of the two sons of the sultan, until the sultan got killed after 
his return from ʿAqabat Ayla. Then, the amir Aynabak led the regime, Barqūq 
becoming one of the amirs of forty. Thereupon, he took hold of the stable and 
remained there until he became sultan.”106
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106 Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:154-5; see also Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-ʿIbar, 5:458, 472.
On the brink of a new era?
In sum, in the course of the four days this conflict lasted two clear-cut but fluctuating 
parties appear as opposing each other, including Yalbughāwīya mamluks and amirs on 
both sides. This already seems quite surprising from a modern historiographical 
perspective, but even more surprising is the general observation that the friction between 
these two multifarious parties seems less to have been caused by any lack of morality and 
of respect for traditional values in either camp, and rather to have been closely tied up with 
the actual composition of the Yalbughāwīya, and, by extension, with the subtle but 
irrevocable changes the Mamluk political scene was undergoing. From this perspective, 
modern historiography was right after all to implicate the Yalbughāwīya, but has failed so 
far to grasp the actual background and the deeper meaning of that allegation!
Most importantly, one of the more conspicuous lines along which friction developed in the 
1360s was a generational one, with on one end mamluks of veteran status, stemming from 
households long gone and yet increasingly managing to improve their status, and on the 
other end their junior colleagues, recently imported and firmly tied to their ustādhs’ current 
successes, but despite that only left with crumbs of benefit. Undoubtedly, the actual picture 
was less black and white than stereotyping like this allows for. Nevertheless, from the 
above discussion it is  clear that at the time there generally were such pragmatic processes 
at work in the Mamluk sultanate, from veteran re-employment and rewarding to junior 
acquisition and frustration. Most importantly, the friction caused by the more striking 
extremes of these processes was a reality that should not be questioned and that became 
particularly apparent and relevant as time elapsed. Thus, in December 1366, Yalbughā l-
Khāṣṣakī became the victim of a remarkable coinciding of these processes in the course 
of a rather classical Mamluk struggle for power. At that occasion, veteran ambitions 
concurred with junior frustrations to ignite a rebellious spark, and geographical 
circumstances, including the young sultan’s presence on the rebellious side of the river, 
encouraged that spark to turn into a blaze which even the almighty Yalbughā proved not 
capable of fighting. 
As seen above, this  outcome did not mean the end of those processes, nor of the 
subsequent friction. Much to the contrary: whereas the former were simply continued 
throughout 1367, the latter even came increasingly to the forefront in the new struggles for 
power that ensued after Yalbughā’s murder. In the end, Yalbughā’s  ‘ajlāb’ themselves very 
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prominently fell foul of that friction, when al-Ashraf Shaʿbān’s survival got at stake again 
and his reaction proved surprisingly astute (with due assistance, as all sources did not fail 
to notice, of Cairo’s populace, fed up as they were with the havoc).
In the short run, therefore, the new social and political reality that emerged from this 
seriously advantaged once more veteran mamluks, when from the end of 1367 onwards 
al-Ashraf Shaʿbān turned —either deliberately, or simply by lack of any serious alternative, 
or perhaps  even as a result of both— to such veterans to sustain his  reign. Thus, in the 
course of the next few years, he signed up veterans to become the executive pillars of his 
regime, as with the amirs Uljāy al-Yūsufī (d. 1373), Manklī Bughā al-Shamsī (ca. 
1320-1372), ʿAlī al-Māridānī (ca. 1310-1370), and Manjak al-Yūsufī (ca. 1315-1375).107 
Even more striking, however, is the fact that Shaʿbān also chose to continue the more 
general line of policy vis-à-vis veterans  that had been favored by Yalbughā al-Khāṣṣakī 
and his  peers before, singling out mamluks with a clear pre-1360 background rather than 
his own recruits  in any round of promotions, as may be gathered once more from another 
set of detailed lists of promoted amirs that has been preserved for the remainder of his 
reign, even until its  final year 1377.108 Clearly, in the 1360s and 1370s power and authority 
remained closely linked to the fate and status of the many mamluks who had entered the 
regime in the 1350s, in the 1340s, and even before.
In the long run, however, this  situation did not last, and this was surely not just due to 
those veterans’ natural life cycle. As summarized by al-Maqrīzī above, in March 1377 
rehabilitated survivors from Yalbughā’s  ‘ajlāb’ in particular suddenly managed to 
successfully engage with a process of estrangement between Shaʿbān and his supporters, 
generating finally their own access to rank and status and eventually culminating, in 
November 1382, in the dissolution of the Qalāwūnid sultanate and the enthronement of 
one of their own, Barqūq.
Surely, friction between on the one hand veterans and their established interests and on 
the other juniors and their hunger for change is nothing new in history, and this 
qualification is all the more valid for the Mamluk sultanate, in the era of the Qalāwūnid 
sultanate between 1279 and 1382 as well as  in general. What is, however, remarkable in 
this  respect, offering insight into another conspicuous line along which that friction 
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107 See Van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos, 109, 162-3.
108 For these lists, see al-Bayrūtī, 40r-40v, 52v, 56v-57, 80-80v, 82, 84, 100, 107; Ibn Duqmāq, “Nuzhat al-
Anām”, fol. 43r, 60r, 83v, 85, 110v-111r; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, 3:161-2, 176-7, 185, 216, 219, 225-6, 255, 270, 
387-8.
developed in the 1360s, is  that these processes and the conflicts they fed into no longer 
took place within the confines of one, royal, household, be it 14th-century Qalāwūnid or 
13th-century Ayyubid/Ṣāliḥīd. This was not a friction which involved that royal household 
and its members in any meaningful manner, despite the political nature of what was at 
stake. Rather, in the 1360s things revolved increasingly around the household of the amir 
Yalbughā al-Khāṣṣakī, without any royal involvement, but also, however, without strictly 
being limited to Yalbughā’s assorted environment. This was in fact not even a friction that 
took place within the confines of any one household, between its  senior and junior 
members, as had happened so often in the past, from the Bahrīya’s  actions against Tūrān 
Shāh to al-Nāṣir Ḥasan’s collisions with his father’s mamluks and, eventually, with some of 
his own. Rather, there were two broad generational social categories at work that, 
especially as far as veterans are concerned, had little more in common than the insecure 
fate they were sharing and the pragmatic approach they took to circumventing that 
problem. As such, the December 1366 conflict and its aftermath was  one of the very first 
political conflicts of substance in the 14th century that were fought outside of the umbrella 
of the Qalāwūnid sultanate, that is by a majority of contenders for authority and status that 
had at most only very limited ties with the royal house. This was therefore a first, but 
ominous breach of the Qalāwūnid political monopoly, originating in the fissioning of great 
households under the Qalāwūnid umbrella in the 1340s and 1350s.109
Moreover, this  was also a first and ominous breach in Qalāwūnid household politics, when 
the conflict and the friction it resulted from no longer were about realigning loyalties within 
the Qalāwūnid house or its  offshoots, but about gaining support and status by a majority of 
outsiders to any such traditional framework of reference. In such a transforming 
environment, new political strategies had to be devised, including the tendency to give 
absolute priority to the alignment of those outsiders  through material rewards, as opposed 
to the more traditional preference that used to be shown to those that were already firmly 
tied to one’s social and political success anyway.
The far more tiered and friction prone political system which such strategies  automatically 
give rise to, with veteran amirs on one side of the political spectrum and junior mamluks or 
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‘ajlāb’ on the other, tied through quite distinct sets of alliances to the political leaders of the 
day, is actually quite reminiscent of Mamluk politics as  it has been described for the 15th 
century. In fact, similarities  are so striking that Jean-Claude Garcin’s description of this 
aspect of that next century’s political system in the Cambridge History of Egypt reminds 
immediately of the historical processes described above for the December 1366 conflict 
and its aftermath: 
From 1428… the problem first appeared of recruits who were unruly, not because 
they … would not have had a political future in the framework of their integration into 
the system, but because that integration could not happen fast enough. Faced with 
the recruits, the amirs, now with fewer mamluks, found themselves  at a loss. The rift 
between the old troops and newcomers brought about a corresponding strengthening 
of the move to form the older ones  into an aristocracy. … So a new political 
mechanism had gradually been imposed: any amir who rose to be sultan had first to 
remove his  predecessor’s recruits, relying on the previous age group that had been 
kept in the wings until that point, which marked their genuine entry into the political 
arena. The initial rhythm of Mamluk political life was thus much slowed down.110
Clearly, “the problem …of recruits” and the “new political mechanism” did not first appear 
in 1428 or thereabout, but became increasingly apparent already from the December 1366 
conflict onwards, filling the vacuum left by the slowly disintegrating Qalāwūnid house. 
Viewed from this perspective, however, the take-over by the ajlāb, Barqūq’s ending of the 
Qalāwūnid sultanate in November 1382, and his deliberate attempt to impose his own 
Ẓāhirī household, including his own lineage and his  own mamluks, as the new framework 
of social and political reference instead of the defunct Qalāwūnid one, actually suspended 
the emergence of such an entirely new political system. As such, the sultanates of Barqūq 
and his sons  (1382-1412) were not so much a radical break from the past, as traditionally 
references tend to portray them, but rather an attempt to link up again with that past and to 
restore once more to pre-eminence the traditional royal household, as a comprehensive 
political unit that firmly monopolized the regime, its political economy and Mamluk society 
at large, far beyond the limits of generational pragmatism. 
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Despite the fact that the latter observations and their background obviously need further 
qualification, it is  already clear that this attempt at a reversal of historical processes that 
had first come to the surface in the 1360s did not, in the long run, manage to eradicate 
those processes. This was surely as  much due to their innate resilience and embryonic 
presence in traditional Mamluk political practices (as in the cyclical or “generational” nature 
of rank-and-file acquisition, training and employment, as well as  in the afore-mentioned 
reliance on numerical strength), as to the many crises which the turn of the century 
witnessed. From 1412 onwards, therefore, change did eventually re-emerge, when a 
tiered, exclusive system of veteran amirs, junior mamluks and political (and financial!) 
pragmatism gradually came to supersede a more inclusive household system, and an 
overall process set in which unmistakably should be identified as one of Mamluk state 
formation, at the cost of traditional household politics.111
Processes of historical change like these, then, originating in the middle of the 14th 
century, catching momentum from the 1360s onwards, and only temporarily suspended 
towards the end of the century, led the sultanate towards its  own version of early 
modernity in the course of the 15th century. Clearly, no one in particular, not even Yalbughā 
or his  mamluks, can or should be blamed individually for generating transformations which 
they were all subject to. They are rather a token of the dynamic nature of Mamluk history, 
as they were gradually yet irrevocably heralding a new era!
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the universityʼs Research Foundation, 2009-2012) to start with the detailed reconstruction and assessment 
of these transformations on the basis of prosopographical research. The overarching projectʼs title is “The 
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